

**BASKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
PSYCHOLOGY MASTER'S PROGRAM**

**THE EFFECT OF EXISTENTIAL ANXIETIES ON EMOTIONS &
FEELINGS**

MASTER'S THESIS

AUTHOR

DİCLE ROJDA TASMAN

ANKARA –2020

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SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ

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ABSTRACT

Existentialism is the philosophy of the essence of human existence, its value, and its meaning (Panza & Gale, 2008). From the perspective of existentialism, existential anxieties (death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness) are specific intrinsic properties that are an unavoidable part of the human being's existence in the world (Yalom, 1980). Since both existential anxieties and emotions play significant role in human life, they are the main focus of the present study. Even though many existentialists talked about emotions (e.g., Kierkegaard, 1980/1844; Sartre, 1993/1948) and existential anxieties (e.g., Heidegger, 1962/1927; Yalom, 1980), there appeared almost no empirical study on the effects of those four existential anxieties on emotions. Thus, the main purpose of the present study to find out the effects of existential anxieties (death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness) on emotions/feelings. First, in order to identify emotion and feeling words, lexicography of Turkish emotion and feeling words made in the dictionary study. Also, in Pilot Study 1, an open-ended question about participants' feelings about the existential anxiety texts were asked. By taking into consideration the literature, dictionary study, and content analysis of Pilot Study 1, 47 different Turkish emotion/feeling words were selected for the Emotions/Feelings Scale. Then, the factorability of the 47 items was examined. Accordingly, 30 items were used as a negative emotions/feelings score and 14 items were used a positive emotions/feelings scores. Second, in order to see whether different existential anxieties will affect the likings of different paintings, the Pilot Study 2 was conducted. After reading existential anxiety texts, participants were asked to write down what kind of photo, picture, or graphic they visualized in their mind about each concept of anxiety and also, the opposite concept of each anxiety. By taking into consideration the participants' responses, 9 different paintings were selected according to 3 different categories (3 for each category). Paintings that include human figures, abstract, and nature paintings were used as 3 different categories. Finally, in the main study, the effect of type of existential anxieties on emotions/feelings and painting liking scores were examined. However, neither emotions/feelings nor the painting liking scores were significantly changed according to existential anxiety conditions. The possible reasons for these results were discussed.

Keywords: death, freedom, isolation, meaninglessness, emotions

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CHAPTER I: EMOTIONS AND FEELINGS

Emotion theory had its roots in philosophy. It can be said that in the West, from the ancient times to 1860, mainly philosophy and theology talked about emotions, along with medicine, literature, and rhetoric (Strongman, 2003). Even though experimental psychology dominate the domain of emotion after 1860, this dominance replaced with neuroscience in the late 20th-century (Plamper, 2015). Emotion has been the topic of interest since ancient times, and seemingly it will not lose its popularity for much longer time. Since origins of emotion theory laid back to philosophy, first, philosophers' ideas about emotion, and then, the theories of emotion in psychology domain will be discussed. In order to clearly see how the ideas about emotion evolved, theories will be presented in a chronological order. Finally, the definition of emotion will be made and its related concepts will be discussed.

1.1. The Philosophy of Emotions

Philosophers' interest to the essence of emotion goes back to Socrates (Lewis, Haviland-Jones, & Barrett, 2008). Even though the subject field has expanded as quest for reason, the emotion have been hidden in the backstage, usually as a menace for reason. The master-slave metaphor was one of the long-lasting metaphors about emotion and reason. There was the emotion's inferior role in which it needed to be controlled by reason because it has been viewed as more primitive, less smart, more bestial, less reliable, and more threatening compared to reason. Also, there was the reason-emotion differentiation like we were handling with two contradictory, antagonistic, and distinct kinds (Lewis et al., 2008). In order to examine the philosophers' ideas on emotion more deeply, philosophers' thoughts will be discussed from ancient time to the 20th-century.

1.1.1. Ancient philosophers

Plato, one of the most important ancient Greek philosopher, considered emotion as something that confounds, interrupts, or distracts human reason (Strongman, 2003). His tripartite soul made up of reason, spirit, and appetite (Strongman, 2003). Emotion seem to be divided between spirit and appetite, however, there were emotions that seem to be related with reason too (Lewis et al., 2008). His pupil Aristotle, made one of the earliest recorded definitions, also one of the most enduring and influential ones, by describing the Greek term pathos (pathē in the plural). In fact, pathē was first used to refer to circumstances that originated of themselves by Plato and Aristotle (Plamper, 2015). Providing the foundation for further reflection upon aesthetics and feelings, Aristotle usually associated pathē with the

world of imagination. Accordingly, he saw the emotions as affections that leads men to alter their opinion according to their judgments. To him, emotions were accompanied by pleasure and pain. He considered each emotion as itself having a positive and a negative sense, and as being capable of generating pleasure or pain, thus, he did not merely separate between positive and negative emotions (Plamper, 2015).

Aristotle also discussed specific emotions at length (Lewis et al., 2008). Moreover, he viewed emotions as interesting aspects of existence and as being regarded as by a combination of greater cognitive and a smaller sensual life. He saw that some of our feelings emerging from our perspectives of the world around, preceding much of modern cognitive psychology (Strongman, 2003). Thus, it seems that Aristotle have foreseen the most of the basic contemporary theories. For instance, a particular cognitive constituent, a behavioral tendency, a particularized social circumstance, and an acknowledgement of physiological arousal involved in his analysis of anger (Lewis et al., 2008).

It is worth noting that, his view of emotion was related with ethics (Strongman, 2003). When looking at the Roman era, the combination of emotion and ethics in the Stoics' philosophy also can be found. Nevertheless, even though Aristotle viewed emotion as fundamental for better life, the Stoics saw them as conceptual faults, paving the way for misery. Emotions were viewed as opinions about the world and one's position in it by the Stoics Seneca and Chrysippus two millennia ago (Lewis et al., 2008). Because they viewed the world as beyond control and any rational expectations, emotions, which inflict those expectations about the world, were regarded as misled opinions about the world. As a result, the emotions leave human beings desperate and disappointed. Psychic indifference or *apatheia* (apathy) were seen as an alternative. Going beyond the futilities of the everyday world was seen as a higher reason (Lewis et al., 2008).

During the Middle Ages, the emotion studies was also usually associated with ethics, and dominated the Christian psychology (Lewis et al., 2008). There were detailed, quasi-medical researches about the diverse humours' impacts on emotional temperament, but there were particularly plentiful researches about the cognitive and conative facets of the emotions. Desires, especially self- interested, self-absorbed desires, were associated with emotions. The greatest virtues like love and hope were not categorized as emotions, instead, usually equaled to reason. The old metaphor of master-slave maintained, and some emotions were viewed as sins (Lewis et al., 2008).

1.1.2. 16th to 17th-century philosophers

After Aristotle, Descartes' conceptualization dominated the philosophy of emotion, until psychology theories begin to originate (Strongman, 2003). Descartes, who is usually known as the father of modern philosophy, contemned the bodily and the bestial, persisted on the idea that the mind is a distinct substance from the body (Lewis et al., 2008). Because of the separation of mind and body, his name is associated with dualism (Strongman, 2003). For Descartes and his successors, the split of these entities constitutes a puzzling problem (Lewis et al., 2008).

Like Aristotle, Descartes' explanation of emotion was fundamentally cognitive. His place for emotion does not only involve physiological alterations and behavior, but mental processes like belief, perception, and memory as well (Strongman, 2003). According to him, the emotion experiences and therefore its basis occurs in the soul. It is possible that for animals' bodies to give reaction like experiencing emotion, however, the experience of it, in fact, is not possible for them. Thus, he viewed emotions as only the human issue, animals just have bodies (Strongman, 2003).

According to Descartes' theory, the mind and body encounter in a small gland at the basis of the brain (pineal gland) (Lewis et al., 2008). Emotions do not only contain sensations that result from this physiological agitation, but desires, perceptions, and beliefs too. Emotion is not just a perception of the body; it might be a perception of the soul as well, and some perceptions might actually be of things that do not exist at all (Lewis et al., 2008). To him, emotion is one kind of passion and passions are different from clear cognitions and they are dangerous for judgment (Strongman, 2003). Even though emotions are especially disturbing passions, they can be effected by reason (Lewis et al., 2008). In his book *On the Passions of the Soul* (1989/1649), he describes six primitive passions, which are admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness. According to him, the rest is compounded of some of these six, or is sorts of them (Descartes, 1989/1649).

Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza, just like the Stoics, developed the earlier model of the cognitive emotion theory. As Stoics view the emotions as misguided opinions about the world, he also viewed the emotions as a kind of thoughts that, mostly, make us misunderstand the world and therefore, miserable (Lewis et al., 2008). To be more specific, he states that emotion is a confused idea (Spinoza, 2011/1677). Even though most of the emotions will hurt us, the active emotions arise from human beings' nature and raise

awareness. Spinoza argued that happiness can be accomplished through getting straight to thinking about the world, thus, unlike the Stoics, his aim was not the psychic indifference known as *apatheia*. Specifically, to him, the notion that being in control of the life should be given up, and rather, the all-embracing notion of ourselves and our minds as part of God should be adopted. He also advocated a complicated metaphysics, in which all substance is one, and mind and body are duple sides of the exact being (Lewis et al., 2008).

In his book *Etica* there is a big chapter separated for on the origin and nature of the emotions (Spinoza, 2011/1677). He refers to emotion, as the modifications of the body. He states that when he says emotion, he understands these body emotions that cause the body's power to increase or decrease, and also the ideas of these emotions. He calls it action if it can be the cause of any of these modifications, otherwise he calls it as a passion. Moreover, under the title of the definition of emotions he gives explanations of desire, pleasure, pain, wonder, contempt, love, hatred, inclination, aversion, devotion, derision, hope, fear, confidence, despair, joy, disappointment, pity, approval, indignation, envy, sympathy, humility, pride, benevolence, revenge, and many other emotions. He also calls emotion as passivity of the soul (Spinoza, 2011/1677).

1.1.3. 18th to 19th-century philosophers

David Hume was one of advocate of the Enlightenment, which was the very outspoken and usually rebellious intellectual movement that questioned old orthodoxies and raised science (Lewis et al., 2008). He questioned the passion's inferior place in philosophy. He insisted on the idea that our passions motivate us to right behavior and the passions merit main respect and regard (Lewis et al., 2008). To him, there are both good emotions (such as pride) and bad emotions (such as humility) (Hume, 1896/1739).

Hume and his well-known friend and co-worker Adam Smith together advocated the significance of what they referred the *moral sentiments* and sympathy, which is the ability of *feeling with* other people and acknowledge their tragedy (Lewis et al., 2008). They discussed that sympathy is a universal characteristic of human beings, and the basic foundation of society and morality. To put in a different way, emotion is the very basis of human social existence and morality. It is not against to reason, rather, it is celebrated and defended together with the reason (Lewis et al., 2008). According to Hume (1896/1739), there are direct (e.g., desire, hope) and indirect passions e.g., (pride, humility). Direct

passions emerge instantly from good or bad, or from pain or pleasure. In addition to junction of other qualities, indirect passions arise from same principles (Hume, 1896/1739).

Immanuel Kant, who was a defender of the Enlightenment too, challenged the reason (Lewis et al., 2008). Thus, he supported the important differentiation between reason and the *inclinations* (emotions, moods, and desires). He persisted that without passion nothing great is ever done and acknowledged the significance of shared feeling in acknowledging beauty and awe with which we try to comprehend the curiosity of God's formation (Lewis et al., 2008).

Friederich Nietzsche was a philosopher whose work influenced different domains including psychology. He defined and appreciated the darker, more instinctual, and more irrational motivations of the mind by anticipating the broad skepticism and chaos of the 20th-century. Thus, he praised the passions and defined the passions as having more reason than *reason* itself with an ironic twist. However, this does not mean that all passions are wise; he asserts that some lower us with their stupidity, and others are deceptive and smart but leads to a disastrous end (Lewis et al., 2008). In his book *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1989/1887), Nietzsche states that great affects like anger, fear, voluptuousness, revenge, hope, triumph, despair, and cruelty awakens men from their slow melancholy and release their dull pain and lingering misery, but only for a time. In the end, every such orgy of feeling as he states, makes the sick sicker. Because of that, he regards those feelings as guilty (Nietzsche, 1989/1887)

1.1.4. 20th-century philosophers

In the 20th-century, because of the overstated stress on logic and science, the emotions were given short shrift in North America and in England. For William James, the nature of emotion was a major concern in the beginning years of the century. With his stress on emotion's physiological nature, coupled with the following separation between philosophy and psychology, questions related to emotions were reduced to the psychology domain (Lewis et al., 2008). James' theory of emotion will be more deeply discussed later.

In midcentury, when a theory called *emotivism* dominated the English and the North America, the actual main focus on emotion in Anglo-American philosophy drawn. Emotion returned back to the philosophy, but just as at the end of the debate. Because ethical arguments were considered as nothing but expressions of emotion, they were regarded as meaningless (Lewis et al., 2008). However, during this period in Europe, the emotions

noticed more. Trying to find an ethics on a basis of emotions, Franz Brentano succeeded the British *moral sentiment* theorists (Sigmund Freud was one of his students). Moreover, in France and Germany, the philosophical examination of emotion maintained in spite of the continuous changes in trends. Coming after the Edmund Husserl's *phenomenology*, philosophy, in which emotions seen as central to human existence, was developed by Martin Heidegger. He was the advocate of the idea that what he usually named *moods* as human beings' way of *being tuned* to the world (Lewis et al., 2008).

According to Heidegger (1962/1927), the phrase *state-of-mind* implies to the most familiar and everyday kind of thing, which is our *mood*, our *Being-attuned*. Mood is a basic existential way to bring Being to its *there*. In his book, *Being and time* (1962/1927), he uses the terms *Dasein*, which means *Being-there*, and *Being-in-the-world* frequently. The term *world* implies the totality of entities within the world, the Being of those entities, and the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood. On the other hand, *Being* indicates *to reside alongside* and *to be familiar with*. Therefore, Heidegger (1962/1927) states that *Being-in* is "the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state" (p. 80). Moreover, he distinguishes anxiety from fear, which are both modes of state-of-mind. His ideas about anxiety (*angst*) will be more deeply discussed later in Chapter II.

In the shadow of World War II, elaborated *phenomenological* analyses of emotion presented by Jean-Paul Sartre. His notion of emotions as *magical transformations of the world* supplemented a novel *existential* dimension to the study of emotion (Lewis et al., 2008). Sartre (1993/1948) states that for the establishment of a phenomenological psychology, he proposes the theory of emotion. The purpose of emotion theory is to serve as an experiment for phenomenological psychology. He calls a sudden drop of consciousness into the magical as *emotion* (Sartre, 1993/1948). Thus, when the world of instruments suddenly vanishes and the magical world comes up in its place, there is emotion. Accordingly, he states, we do not need to consider emotion as a passive disorder of the organism and the mind that comes from the outside to disturb the psychic life. Rather, as Sartre (1993/1948) puts it "it is the return of consciousness to the magical attitude, one of the great attitudes which are essential to it, with appearance of the correlative world, the magical world" (p. 90-91). By referring to Heidegger, Sartre (1993/1948) asserts that emotion is "a mode of existence of consciousness, one of the ways in which it understands its *being-in-the-world*" (p. 91).

A philosopher-psychologist Herbert Spencer asserts that the psychological states that identified as feelings cannot be separated from intellectual processes (Spencer, 1855). Neither any act of cognition can be completely free of emotion, nor can any emotion be completely free of cognition. Only, the emotion accompanying cognition can be strong or weak or the quantity of cognition involved in emotion can change. This relationship between cognition and emotion can be clearly seen by examining the association between perception and sensation, which are the simplest kinds of the two. Spencer (1855) states that “memory, reason, and feeling are different sides of the same psychological phenomenon” (p. 585). According to Gendron and Barrett (2009), Spencer may be identified as a psychological constructionist with basic emotion tendencies.

During the 1800s the new science of psychology was arising, and it became essential for it to separate itself from other competing sciences, particularly theology, to create its own domain and form its legitimacy (Plamper, 2015). Because, during this process, the subterranean influence of the long tradition of Christian thought about feelings was continuing, it also had to separate itself from anti-science, Christian cosmology. During these decades of the later 19th-century, the reductionist epistemology and practice of the laboratories of experimental psychology led to the separation of emotion from free will. Psychological experimental design that invented at this time, found hard to measure how humans and animals feel what they do; how humans evaluate, handle with, and affect their emotions. Epistemology determined experiments, and vice versa and emotional experiments determined conceptions of emotion, and vice versa, thus, the process through which experimental design developed was actually reciprocal (Plamper, 2015).

Around the same time, a physiological conception of emotion, separated from free will and intention, which could be used to the investigation of both humans and animals was developed by representatives of the newly psychology field (Plamper, 2015). Because of the emergence of a transnational scientific community whose members corresponded with each other, met at conferences, sent each other books and offprints, and exchanged doctoral student, this particular idea spread very quickly. Even though the decoupling of emotion from intention is often associated with one particular psychologist, William James, this transnational networking makes it impossible to determine where it originated (Plamper, 2015).

Taking into consideration the essence of philosophy and its interest with epistemological issues, instead of the sensory, social, or physiological aspects of emotion, the focus is on the conceptual aspect of emotion. Because of the reaction to the *hypercognizing* of emotion, a serious effort has been made to unite powers with psychologists, neurologists, anthropologists, and moral philosophers to acquire a more holistic emotion theory (Lewis et al., 2008).

1.2. The Psychology of Emotions

Psychology is a discipline that has origins in philosophy, biology, and physiology (King, 2008). A German philosopher-physician Wilhelm Wundt, formed the field of psychology by establishing the first psychology laboratory in 1879. Since it is a discipline that scientifically studies behavior and mental processes (King, 2008), it is not surprising that many researchers have been interested in emotion to a great extent (e.g., Cannon, 1927; Duffy, 1934; James, 1884; Lazarus, 1982; McDougall, 1918/1908; Schachter & Singer, 1962). While Wundt himself studied emotions (see Wundt, 1907/1863, and Wundt, 1998/1897), the word *emotion* has been a theoretical keyword at the heart of modern psychology since William James wrote his famous article *What Is an Emotion?* in 1884 (Dixon, 2012). Before discussing the important ideas about emotion in field of psychology, it is worth to mention one important name: Charles Darwin.

Charles Darwin who had a significant influence on many things had a significant effect on the former apprehension of emotion too. He tried to put humans on a continuum with other animals, depending on his documentation of emotional expressions of various species (Strongman, 2003). In his book *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872), Darwin asserts that emotion expressions, or the language of the emotions, are important for the welfare of mankind. He discusses the inheritance of expressions and the instinctive recognition of these expressions (Darwin, 1872).

Moreover, Darwin examines the expression of emotions like anger, disgusts, contempt, love, surprise, guilt, pride, joy, and shyness (Darwin, 1872). Also, definition of the some emotions can inferred from his writings. For instance, according to Darwin (1872), “if we expect to suffer, we are anxious; if we have no hope of relief, we despair” (p. 178). It can be said that, he inspired the simple emotion approach in the psychology of emotion (Gendron & Barrett, 2009).

1.2.1. The 19th to 20th-century theories

1.2.1.1. Emotions from the view of the father of psychology

Wilhelm Wundt, through his study of sense perception, he came across with emotions. First, he established a theory of the formation of the senses. Then, he turned his attention to their processes and functioning and expanded his interest to the entire psychical apparatus, thus came to the emotions. He separated brief emotions from longer-lasting, more complex affects, including complex emotions which were also related to the field of aesthetics. For him, emotions were important to cognition and he asserted that even newborn babies can separate sweet from sour, and pleasant from unpleasant feelings (Plamper, 2015).

In his book *Outlines of Psychology* (1998/1897), in order to discriminate emotions, Wundt discusses three psychological principles of classification: the quality of the feelings going into the emotions, the intensity of these feelings, and the form of happening that is conditioned by the feature and rate of the affective alterations. According to him, while the word *feeling* is used for slower processes and for those which in their ordinary form of occurrence cannot go beyond a particular medium intensity, *emotion* is used for the unitary succession of feelings. Thus, when a series of feelings coming after one another in time unify to an interconnected process which is differentiated from former and latter processes as an individual whole, it is called emotion (Wundt, 1998/1897). Compared to a single feeling, emotion has a more intense influence on the subject. Because emotion is distinguished from feeling by the influence which comes from a particular unification of specific affective contents, there is no clear line of distinction between feeling and emotion. To him, every feeling of bigger intensity enters into an emotion, and the distinction between them is contingent on a random abstraction (Wundt, 1998/1897).

In another book *Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology* (1907/1863), Wundt defines emotion as having three stages: “an initial feeling; a subsequent change in the train of ideas, intensifying and qualitatively modifying the initial feeling; a final feeling” (p. 372). It is possible that, this final feeling, of more or less duration, may generate a new emotion of which it constitutes the initial feeling. According to him, the main distinction between feeling and emotion can be found in the second stage (the change in the train of ideas). Because of the presence of this change, emotions can be classified into two classes: excitant (e.g., joy and anger) and inhibitory (e.g., terror and fear). Emotion's effect on the train of

ideas are reflected as an external movement (Wundt, 1907/1863). He discusses the emotions' physiological effect on the body. To him, the excitant emotion quickens ideation, increases cardiac activity, and enlarges the blood-vessels. On the other hand, the inhibitory emotion paralyses (or relaxes) the muscles, slowdowns the heart-beat, and shrinks the vessels. All these physiological influences have their company of sense-feeling that condenses the affective components in the emotion. He defines *moods* as less intensive degrees of emotion. Because the length of emotion changes inversely with its intensity, when compared to emotions, moods are more enduring states of mind. Moreover, he states that the word *passion* is sometimes used for violent emotions. Passion indicates that a specific emotion has become habitual (Wundt, 1907/1863).

1.2.1.2. McDougall's theory of emotion

William McDougall's emotion theory was based on some fundamental biological regards and was closely linked to motivation (McDougall, 1918/1908). He also tried to distinguish between emotions and feelings. He thought that the capacity to approach useful goals is essential to psychological functioning. He adds that all behavior arises from searching food or avoiding from noxious stimuli. He discusses that emotions take place as additions to these main processes and stems from the way in which we perceive our environment and our diverse bodily changes. Even though he considers only pleasure and pain as modifying goal-directed behavior, he acknowledges the human beings' cognitive nature as well. This cognitive aspect is the source of expectations, experiences (to get them fused) and unusual concentrations of feelings. It differentiates humans from other creatures (Strongman, 2003).

In his book *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1918/1908), McDougall offers two principles in order to rank any human emotion or impulse to rank as a primary emotion or simple instinctive impulse. First, the emotion and impulse are primary and simple if a similar emotion and impulse are demonstrated with clarity in the instinctive activities of the higher animals. However, the affective state is either a complex composite emotion or no true emotion when no such instinctive activity takes place among the higher animals. Second, according to McDougall (1918/1908), in each case it must be inquired that "whether the emotion and impulse in question occasionally appear in human beings with morbidly exaggerated intensity, apart from such general hyper-excitability as is displayed in mania" (p. 51).

McDougall's emotion theory based on the idea that during human evolution goals became more precise and goal-directed behavior became more particularized, which caused more specialized bodily modifications. Moreover, according to him, unlike other animals, human beings rarely experience the primary emotions in the pure or unmixed forms. Human beings' emotional states usually originate from the simultaneous excitement of two or more of the instinctive dispositions. Most of the names that are used to indicate diverse emotions are the names of such mixed, secondary, or complex emotions (McDougall, 1918/1908).

1.2.1.3. The James-Lange theory

One of the most famous emotion theory is the James–Lange Theory, which led to a debate that has extend from the 19th to the 21st-century (Strongman, 2003). Even though William James was its leading advocate, Carl Georg Lange also contributed. The theory was asserted at the same time by James and Lange. James restricted his domain to emotions, which have a separate bodily expression. His goal was to make a distinction between mental processes that have no evident physiologic accompaniment and those in which obvious and therefore, observable alterations take place (Strongman, 2003).

Even though it is thought that the mental affection called the emotion excited by the mental perception of some fact and this emotion generates some bodily expression, James (1884) wrote, “my thesis on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion” (p. 189–190). The essence of his theory based on the idea that the visceral discharges linked with some external condition cause the emotion as we know and experience it (James, 1884).

To promote his theory, James mostly depended on introspection. The essential points of the James–Lange theory are that the feeling aspect of emotion produced by afferent feedback from disturbed organs and emotions is any cortical activity which stems from this feedback. Moreover, James did not only make emphasis on the role of the viscera in emotion, he gave a similar role to the voluntary muscles as well. This provided the basis for a search for bodily patterns in emotion and for theories that emphasize the importance of facial expression in emotion (Strongman, 2003).

To sum up, assuming the existence of discrete emotions, first fully psychological emotion theory produced by James and Lange. Even though there happens to be an inherent untestability, which has proved a consistent irritant, in the James–Lange theory, emphasizing

the significance of the visceral and of facial expression it has had great influence (Strongman, 2003).

1.2.1.4. The Cannon–Bard Theory

Walter Bradford Cannon asserted his ideas on emotion with Philip Bard in reaction to James' and for the purpose of offering an alternative theory, known as Cannon–Bard Theory (Strongman, 2003). According to Cannon (1927), emotional expression stems from action of subcortical center and “thalamic processes are a source of effective experience” (p. 118).

He criticizes James' regard to visceral factors as a source of afferent stream. Cannon (1927) states that, in order to be a resource of emotional feeling, visceral changes are too slow and “the viscera are relatively insensitive structures” (p. 111). Emotional behavior does not changed by the total separation of the viscera. The same visceral changes take place in dissimilar emotional and non-emotional states. Strong emotions do not produced by the artificial induction of the visceral changes that common for those emotions (Cannon, 1927).

Cannon discusses that emotions are based on a similar series of occurrences. Receptors, which transfer impulses to the cortex, stimulated by an environmental situation. Then, thalamic processes, which act in patterns corresponding to specific emotional expressions, stimulated by the cortex (Strongman, 2003). He believes that, in order to release the neurons in the thalamus, nothing more specific is required than that. According to him, two functions of the nervous discharge from the thalamus are exciting muscles and viscera and transferring information back to the cortex. When the thalamic processes are aroused, the peculiar quality of the emotion is joined to a simple sensation. Thus, we experience the emotion almost at the same time with the bodily changes when the thalamus discharges. Cannon drew attention to the importance of the thalamus to emotion. The importance of his theory is based on its stress on the neurophysiology of emotion (Strongman, 2003).

1.2.1.5. The Papez circuit

After Cannon, it was James Wenceslas Papez's theory of emotion, Papez circuit, that had a physiological basis. In his article *A Proposed Mechanism of Emotion* (1937), Papez states that the word *emotion* indicates two conditions: a way of acting (emotional expression) and a way of feeling (emotional experience or subjective feeling). Papez (1937), proposes that “the hypothalamus, the anterior thalamic nuclei, the gyrus cinguli, the hippocampus and

their interconnections constitute a harmonious mechanism which may elaborate the functions of central emotions, as well as participate in emotional expression” (p. 743). His theory based on the basic idea that emotion indicates behavior (expression) and feeling (experience, subjective aspects). The expression is contingent upon the hypothalamus and experience on the cortex (Strongman, 2003).

Before moving to MacLean’s limbic system, it is worth to go back in time and mention the case of Phineas Gage. In the history of medicine, and of emotion, this case still remains of interest to neuroscientists and philosophers today (Plamper, 2015). His case treated as the origin of one of the most important approaches to emotions, via the study of lesions, from historical accounts of the study of emotion in experimental psychology. Fundamentally, lesions (which are damage to, and thus, the closing-down of specific areas of the brain) considered as the typical medical indicators in the brain research of this period. When a specific zone stopped to function and abnormal behavior was observed at the same time, the two elements were brought together into a causal relationship and the damaged area took responsible for the dysfunction, thus this area was seen as being responsible for the corresponding function in a healthy state. Thus, it was presumed that damage to a specific area of the brain allows making inferences considering the functions of that area. Subsequently, lesions were intentionally made in the brains of animals for testing. Also, by the removal of specific parts of the brain, humans with specific kinds of emotional disorders were healed'. Cases like that of Phineas Gage attracted attention to the brain as being the place of emotional processes. Although there were lots of experimental psychological studies on emotion during the first half of the 20th-century, Cannon-Bard, Papez, and MacLean laid the base for the brain-based studies of emotion (Plamper, 2015).

1.2.1.6. MacLean’s limbic system

Paul D. MacLean, the discoverer of the limbic system, formed a novel and comprehensive model of the brain’s anatomy and its relation to emotion. He claimed that the phylogenetically old brain (rhinencephalon or visceral brain) is mostly related with visceral and emotional functions (MacLean, 1949). To him, because this region of the brain is able to associate every form of internal and external perception, it can be said that it is strategically situated. Thus, it is possible that this region may associate oral (smell, taste, mouth) and visceral sensations, and impressions from the sex organs, body wall, eye, and ear. Moreover, unlike the neopallium, in order to discharge its impressions, the

rhinencephalon has many and powerful links with the hypothalamus (MacLean, 1949). He stresses the indication of these claims that, even though, our intellectual functions are sustained in the newest and greatly developed part of the brain, a comparatively crude and primitive system continues to dominate our affective behavior. He states that this condition gives a hint to understand the distinction between what we feel and what we know (MacLean, 1949).

MacLean proposed that the brain consisted of three mutually-related parts. Primitive emotion, such as fear, could be found in the oldest part of the brain, called reptile brain, which involves the striatum and the basal ganglia. Aggression and more complex social emotions can be found in the old mammalian parts of the brain, which involves many regions of the Papez Circuit (hypothalamus, thalamus, hippocampus, and cingulum), and the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex as well. The new mammalian brain, mainly consisted of the neocortex, was first and foremost liable for the cognitive control of emotions. He discussed that emotion was a process which occurred in all three parts of the brain; the sum of three parts was the limbic system, so called after Broca. Specifically, the hippocampus in the older mammalian brain was an active switchboard which received incoming external stimuli and passed them on in order to bring about physical reactions, which were themselves refracted and perceived as emotion. Even though MacLean's original hypotheses were frequently questioned in his lifetime, today whenever the question is raised of the localization of emotion in the brain, one still talks about the limbic system (Plamper, 2015).

1.2.1.7. Duffy's ideas on emotion

According to Duffy (1941), the individual *feels* different when an individual's energy level increases or decreases in distinct degree and "if this change in energy level takes place gradually, is not too extreme, and persists for some time, he experiences a *mood*; if it takes place in extreme degree or occurs suddenly, he is likely to experience an *emotion*" (p. 290). However, the awareness of *how the body feels* is not enough to constitute the whole of the conscious quality of *emotion*. There is an external reference that bodily sensations have. The individual views them as having been resulted by a particular condition (Duffy, 1941). According to Duffy (1941), "they are part of a more comprehensive whole which includes the interpretation of the stimulus situation, expectations of future developments in the situation, and the set of the individual for response to that situation" (p. 290).

Duffy criticizes the general presumption that there is a significant distinction in kind between emotional and other responses. By examining the diverse kinds of emotion explanations, she comes to the decision that in each case the differentiation between emotion and other patterns of reaction is one of degree instead of kind (Duffy, 1934). According to her, the concept is not useful in psychological investigation since the definite degree of a given kind of behavior that is to be named emotional is never asserted. Duffy (1934) states that: “We should cease our attempt to study 'emotion' *sui generis* and should study instead the variations in certain fundamental aspects or dimensions of behavior in general as these occur under varying stimulation and as they correlate with each other” (p. 197) (Duffy, 1934).

1.2.2. Mid-20th-century to 21st-century theories

1.2.2.1. The Schachter-Singer theory

At the end of the 1950s two psychologists, Stanley Schachter and Jerome E. Singer, starting from the point of view that emotional states may be regarded a function of a state of physiological arousal and of a cognition suitable to this state of arousal, they offered three propositions. First, when a person has no instant explanation for a given state of physiological arousal, she could name this state of arousal and define her feelings consistent with the cognitions accessible to her (Schachter & Singer, 1962). In their view, thus, there is not any physical signal to have an exclusive relationship with one emotion. General physical signals do not find an emotional nomenclature until an evaluation procedure takes place. Accordingly, anger, envy, or pleasure are learned ascriptions, applied based on the situation, they are not states of the body (Plamper, 2015). Because cognitive factors are powerful determinants of emotional states, exactly the same state of physiological arousal could be identified as joy, fury, jealousy, or any emotional labels relying on the cognitive sides of the conditions (Schachter & Singer, 1962).

Second, if an individual has a quite proper explanation for a given state of physiological arousal, evaluative needs will not emerge. Third, Schachter and Singer (1962) states: “given the same cognitive circumstances, the individual will react emotionally or describe his feelings as emotions only to the extent that he experiences a state of physiological arousal” (p. 382). The results of their experiment supported their propositions (Schachter & Singer, 1962). While subjects who had been given a physiological explanation for their physical condition (the injection of the vitamin led to an increased heart rate,

shaking hands, etc.) described themselves as unemotional and as basically having had a reaction to the injected solution, those subjects who had not been told of the physical effects of the injection reacted either euphorically or angrily and described their physical reactions as either euphoria or anger (Plamper, 2015).

According to The Schachter–Singer Model, known as the Two-Factor Model or the Cognitive-Physiological Model too, the emotion and physical movement always considered as to be intertwined (without a body, there is no such thing as emotion) and learned cognitions taken responsible for interpretation and specification of the specific emotion involved. The Schachter–Singer Model has been associated with both (neo)Jamesian and cognitive psychology because of its synthetic nature. Although the details of the model have been criticized, this synthesis of cognition and physiology is being positively emphasized even today (Plamper, 2015).

1.2.2.2. Arnold's view on emotions

A few years before Schachter and Singer the American psychologist Magda B. Arnold had developed a model of emotion that involved evaluation of the stimulus which prompted the emotion process, or of the object to which the emotion was directed. To her, an emotion is a felt tendency toward an object appraised suitably, or away from an object appraised unsuitable, reinforced by particular bodily changes in accordance with the kind of emotion. Thus, in order to arouse an emotion in someone, the object must be appraised as affecting that person in some way, affecting her personally as an individual with her specific experience and her specific goals (Plamper, 2015).

To briefly summarize the model, first perception, then appraisal, and finally, emotion occurs. Even though Arnold included an element of appraisal into her model, she agreed with the viewpoint taken by psychologists of emotion working in the Darwinian tradition that emotions were obligatory to the fight for survival. This element of appraisal left a big deal of space for cultural, group-specific, or individual impact. However, she believed in the idea that there is a core that is similar in each person or even animals because otherwise, we could not understand the emotional expression of fellow humans and animals (Plamper, 2015).

At the beginning of the 1980s, attention began to be given the question of how fast appraisal processes were, an issue that was related to a controversy that arose in the later neurosciences. Arnold herself stressed that cognition did not emerge immediately and that

in principle appraisal was direct, immediate, and automatic. Psychologist Robert Zajonc bypassed this aspect of the Arnold approach was in his article, which caused a fierce controversy with another psychologist, Richard S. Lazarus (Plamper, 2015).

1.2.2.3. Zajonc's ideas on emotion

Zajonc offered a model of emotion, in which emotion considered as post-cognitive. To him, emotion's role in all human behavior, especially in where decision-making was involved, was leading, unconscious, and temporally precognitive. Contrary to cognition, affective responses were effortless, inevitable, irreversible, holistic, hard to verbalize, but easy to communicate and understand. In this, he still assumed a rigid distinction between cognition and emotion (Plamper, 2015). While the cognitive system, because of the use of culturally contingent language, regarded as slower, more complex, and more precise, the emotional system regarded as older in evolutionary terms, it provided advantages in survival, and it was prelinguistic, faster, and less conscious, thus, more universal. In the end, emotions could simply be communicated across cultural borders. Zajonc anticipated definitions of emotion typical of later research in the neurosciences by his characterization of emotion as a non-verbal process and combined with the fact that he talked consistently about the affect (Plamper, 2015).

According to Zajonc's (1980) experimental study results, even there is no recognition memory (old-new judgments), dependable affective discriminations (like-dislike ratings) still can be made in the complete absence of recognition memory (old-new judgments). He concludes that affect and cognition are under the control of distinct and in part independent systems, which can effect each other in a various ways. Moreover, independent resources of effects in information processing are constituted by both of them (Zajonc, 1980).

Zajonc, Murphy, and Inglehart (1989) discusses that muscular facial actions can have an independent effect on the person's subjective feeling state. The vascular system, specially the one that furnished the face and the brain, plays a significant role in creating the subjective feeling state. Facial action is not a process that just render service to display function, but also, it is a process that takes part in the continuation and regulation of the vascular system of the head and of its thermoregulation. Since thermoregulation of hypothalamic blood links peripheral processes to brain neurochemistry, it provides an important suggestion to the emotion studies. Finding the emotion specificity at subjective, behavioral, and physiological emotion analysis together is unlikely. In order to distinguish between positive and negative

hedonic experiences, forehead temperature is a dependable psychophysiological measurement (Zajonc, Murphy, & Inglehart, 1989).

1.2.2.4. The cognitive appraisal theory

The appraisal theorist Richard S. Lazarus discusses about the knowledge and appraisal, which are two kinds of cognition that related to emotion. While knowledge is related to the facts of an adaptational encounter, appraisal is related to the personal importance of an experiencing well-being. To shape emotion, knowledge is a distal variable that necessitates an extra process of appraisal to generate an emotion. On the other hand, appraisal is a proximal variable that directly effects whether an emotion will be produced and in that case its type and intensity (Lazarus & Smith, 1988). In another of his article he discusses that thought is a required condition of emotion (Lazarus, 1982). Moreover, he points out the important evidence that emotions are very sensitive to alterations in the person-environment relationship and the way these alterations are appraised. To him, the main duty of a cognitively oriented emotion theory is to put forward how this works (Lazarus, 1984).

Lazarus asserts that Zajonc had characterized cognition in a too restricted fashion such as higher-level cognition of the type involved in considering the solution of a difficult mathematical equation, or the meaning of a complex philosophical text. Instead, according to him, if one used the broader definition of cognition utilized by the appraisal school, which contained the production of meaning from the very beginning, it was plausible to treat appraisal procedures that were mostly unconscious as cognition. To him, it is not necessary for appraisal to be rational and conscious. Cognition described in this way would hence come before emotion temporally, and not the other way around. Although the debate between Zajonc and Lazarus did create a fuss in the early 1980s, even ten years later it seemed old-fashioned, as the study of emotion in the brain revolutionized by newer neuroscientific methods and approaches (Plamper, 2015).

1.2.2.5. Ekman's basic emotions

Paul Ekman is famous for his theory of the basic emotions and those basic emotions are happiness, anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and surprise. He claims that all people from all cultures have those emotions and they are all capable to acknowledge them. There is a corresponding evident facial expression, which is not possible to hide, for every basic emotion. Whenever someone tries to deceive or attempts to mask her feelings, micro-

expressions (even they last only fractions of a second) always give them away (Plamper, 2015).

The leading characteristic of basic emotions is the universal facial expressions, or to be more general, distinctive universal signals. This notion has stayed persistent in his idea even there were changes in his definitions. For instance, over the years, he altered the selection and number of basic emotions. Even though he took into consideration the possibility of adding contempt, shame, guilt, embarrassment, and awe to his emotions, he later claimed to find the consistent evidence for anger, fear, sadness, enjoyment, and disgust, but not for surprise, contempt, shame, and guilt. Later, he narrowed down the definition of basic emotions and discussed that only basic emotions could correctly be called emotions (Plamper, 2015).

Emotions are evolved via their adaptive values in handling with main life-tasks. He describes 9 characteristics to discriminate basic emotions from one another and from other affective phenomena: distinctive universal signals, presence in other primates, distinctive physiology, distinctive universals in antecedent events, coherence among emotional response, quick onset, brief duration, automatic appraisal, and unbidden occurrence. To him, all of those features are the consequence of evolution (Ekman, 1992a). Moreover, in his article (1992b), Ekman discusses the voluntary facial action's capability to produce alterations in both autonomic and central nervous system activity. To him, it is possible to discriminate the smile when enjoyment is happening from other types of smiling (Ekman, 1992b).

Even though Ekman's theory of emotion has internal contradictions and methodological problems, from the 1990s, and particularly in the early 2000s, adopting Ekman's conception of emotion and its neurobiological offshoots became more common in the human sciences (Plamper, 2015).

1.2.2.6. Theory of the two roads to fear

According to LeDoux, emotions or feelings are conscious outcomes of unconscious processes. The storage and retrieval of emotional and declarative memories are in parallel, and their activities are participated in our conscious experience (LeDoux, 1994). That means that we have access to the outcomes like the way we behave, the way our bodies feel. In order to form a new declarative memory, these outcomes merge with current declarative memory. Emotion has a strong effect on declarative memory and other thought processes.

Therefore, it is not only unconscious memory. The amygdala is a significant component of the system related with the acquisition, storage, and expression of fear memory. He also adds that the subjective experiences that termed as feelings are not the primary business of the system that produces them. Emotional experiences are the consequence of triggering systems of behavioral adaptation that have been maintained by evolution (LeDoux, 1994).

Joseph LeDoux's Theory of the Two Roads to Fear - one pathway containing the subcortical region of emotion in the amygdala, which is very old on an evolutionary scale, and the other containing a cortical region where cognition occurs - is among the well-recognized emotion theories considering the way in which presumably basic emotions function (Plamper, 2015). The theory also involves the joint functioning of these two distinct regions. To summarize the theory briefly, a stimulus, which places the body in a state of alarm (raised pulse, and muscles readied to run away from the snake) within about 12 milliseconds, passes into the amygdala, and at the same time passes into the cortex, where a decision of whether the stimulus is really a threat or not is made rapidly by the higher cognitive functions. While the body responds with a fight-or-flight reaction if the cortex decides that the stimulus is in fact threatening, it stands down and returns to a resting state if the cortex decides that there is no threat. Further studies made in the neurosciences made it clear that the links between the amygdala and the cortex were much more numerous and complicated than LeDoux's model proposed, and that neuronal circuits were much more evident than had been thought (Plamper, 2015).

1.2.2.7. Somatic marker hypothesis

Antonio R. Damasio can presumably be described as the leading neuroscientist associated to the study of emotion (Plamper, 2015). In his book *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (1994), he offers the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH). *Iowa Gambling Task (IGT)* experiment, in which test subjects choose playing cards from four different decks, was used to test SMH. The hypothesis states that emotional signals in the body simplifies, accelerates, and improves cognitive processes like decision-making. Somatic markers are impressions or traces of expression of physical emotion arising from the body's periphery (the skin, the hands, the hair) that are left in a specific region of the brain, the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (VMPFC). A promising option becomes colored with a positive emotion when an impending decision has several possible outcomes. Decision-making becomes improved and speeded it up with the exclusion of negative

options. Somatic markers can also function via a direct body loop, a behavioral option being physically marked with a potentially positive outcome, and so rendering the subject aware of this through, for example, an accelerated pulse. Additionally, in order to attract attention to promising behavioral options without employing physical signals, they can make use of an as-if loop, using thoughts as elements of higher cognition (Plamper, 2015).

To sum up, somatic markers are a specific instance of feelings produced from secondary emotions. In order to foresee coming outcomes of particular contexts, emotions and feelings have been linked through learning. The combination functions as an alarm bell when a negative somatic marker is juxtaposed to a specific future outcome. However, it becomes a beacon of incentive when a positive somatic marker is juxtaposed (Damasio, 1994).

1.3. Defining Emotion

The word *emotion*, which translated from the French word *émotion* and means a physical disturbance, began to be used in English in the 17th-century. It did not used as a term for a psychological category and as a subject for systematic study until the 19th-century. Prior to that time, related mental states were classified diversely as appetites, passions, affections, or sentiments (Dixon, 2012). As we can see from the philosophy and psychology of emotions that mentioned above, emotion has defined in many different ways. Dixon (2012) also states that a century and a quarter later after James's article *What Is an Emotion*, it appears that there is not much scientific consensus on the answering that query. Beyond the difficulty of defining emotion, there are concepts such as feeling and mood that closely related to emotion. Next, we will try to differentiate mood and feeling from emotion.

In general, moods are regarded as diffuse affect states and described as a relative enduring predominance of particular types of subjective feelings which has an effect on the experience and behavior of a person (Scherer, 2005). Also, moods are seen to differentiate from emotions in three primary ways. Even though not all researchers agree upon all points, moods are generally seen to be longer in duration, to have lower intensity, and to be more diffuse and global than emotions (Turner, 2004).

According to Ekman (2003), we all have emotions and moods and although both involve feelings, they are different. First and most obvious, moods last much longer than emotions. While moods can go on all day or even more than one day, emotions can come and go in minutes or even seconds. A mood looks like a mild but constant emotional state.

For instance, when we are in a blue mood, it means we are mildly sad and prepared to become very sad. What's more, to him, while a disdainful mood contains the emotions of disgust and contempt, a euphoric mood contains excitement and pleasure, and so on. Also, specific emotions can be activated by moods. For example, if an individual is in an irritable mood, she is looking for an occasion to be angry; she reads the things around us in a way that allows, or even orders, her to be angry. Once she becomes angry, it is possible that the anger will be stronger and last more. Moreover, in order to tell that someone is in a mood, we need to see the signs of the emotion that saturates a mood. Thus, moods don't have signal in neither the face nor the voice. Lastly, even though we rarely know why we are in a mood, once emotion occurs and we realize it, we generally know the event that caused it (Ekman, 2003). While moods usually have no orientation to a target or object, emotions are seeming to be about something, being angry at someone or happy about something. However, not having a target does not mean that it has no particular cause. Moods can also be caused by some event, but they are diffuse and unfocused (Turner, 2004).

According to Damasio (1994), emotion is "the combination of a mental evaluative process, simple or complex, with dispositional responses to that process, mostly toward the body proper, resulting in an emotional body state, but also toward the brain itself, resulting in additional mental changes" (p. 139). Also, there is the perception of all the alterations that form the emotional response. He uses the word *feeling* for the experience of those alterations. He views emotions and feelings as the tangible qualities. Their subject material is definite, and they can be associated to particular systems in body and brain, just like vision. Moreover, the responsible brain systems are not limited to the subcortical sector. In order to construct emotion and feeling, brain core and cerebral cortex function together (Damasio, 1994).

Damasio explains the reason behind not using the words *emotion* and *feeling* interchangeably by that even though some feelings related with emotions, many of them are not related with it. According to him, if you are awake and alert, all emotions produce feelings. However, not all feelings arise from emotions (he calls those feelings as *background feelings* which will be explained later). For him, there are three varieties of feelings: feelings of basic universal emotions, feelings of subtle universal emotions, and background feelings (Damasio, 1994).

The first variety is based on basic universal emotions - happiness, sadness, anger, fear, and disgust - and correspond to profiles of body state response (Damasio, 1994). We

feel happy, sad, angry, fearful, or disgusted when the body is in accord with the profiles of one of those emotions. Attention is distributed considerably to body signals and parts of the body landscape move from the background to the foreground of our attention when we have feelings linked with emotions. The subtle variations of the five emotions that mentioned above constitute the second variety of feelings: euphoria and ecstasy are versions of happiness; melancholy and wistfulness are versions of sadness; panic and shyness are versions of fear. Those feelings are made up by experience, when subtler shades of cognitive state are linked with subtler variations of emotional body state. The link between a complex cognitive content and a variation on a preorganized body-state permits us to experience shades of remorse, embarrassment, Schadenfreude, or vindication (Damasio, 1994).

The third variety of feeling, which he suspects preceded the others in evolution, is the feeling of life itself, the sense of being (Damasio, 1994). Because it originates in *background* body states instead of emotional states, it is called as background feeling. A background feeling is not an emotional body state, that is to say, it is not what we feel when we are despondent over lost love. Instead, it complies the body state predominating between emotions. The background feeling has been superseded by an emotional feeling when we feel happiness, anger, or another emotion. When the background feeling is not shaken by emotion, the background feeling is our image of the body landscape. Although the concept of *mood* is associated to background feeling, it does not completely capture it. The aggregation of background feelings presumably promotes the mood. He also suggests that the very core of our representation of self would be broken without them (Damasio, 1994).

Although we merely have subtle awareness of a background feeling, we are able to tell right away according to its quality. Even though one may hardly notice the background body sense (because it does not represent a specific part of anything in the body, it represents an overall state of most everything in it), the background body sense is continuous. To him, such an ongoing, unstoppable representation of the body state allows us to reply immediately to the particular question of *how do you feel* with an answer that related to whether we feel fine or do not feel that well. Background feeling is largely about body states. He states that our individual identity is fixed on this illusory living sameness (Damasio, 1994).

Damasio's (1994) definition of *emotion*, "the combination of a mental evaluative process, simple or complex, with dispositional responses to that process, mostly toward the body proper, resulting in an emotional body state, but also toward the brain itself, resulting

in additional mental changes” (p. 139), and *feeling*, the experience of all those changes, was used in the present study.

CHAPTER II: EXISTENTIALISM AND EXISTENTIAL ANXIETIES

2.1. Existentialism

“Existence precedes essence.” (Sartre, 2007/1946, p.20)

Existentialism is the philosophy that what makes an authentically human life possible in a meaningless and absurd world. It is the philosophy of the essence of human existence, its value, and its meaning. Even though existentialism is the study of existence, it is not the word of everything that exists. It is the study of existence itself, that is to say, it the study of what it means for something to exist at all against not existing. The main focus of existentialism is a specific type of existence, the kind of existence that involves existing things like people, since they have the awareness of their existence and they are capable of questioning it (Panza, & Gale, 2008). According to Michelman (2008), the common goal of existentialist philosophers is their endeavor to offer a philosophical account of the distinguishing characteristics of human existence that differentiate humans from the other animals, plants, and things. These features involve:

A lived awareness of time and a relationship to death; a more or less explicit understanding of the freedom to act and to interpret the world according to one’s own lights and of one’s responsibility for doing so; and a fundamental concern over the character of one’s life, whether it will be lived authentically, as deliberately one’s own, or inauthentically, as something for which one is not ultimately responsible (Michelman, 2008, p. 1).

According to Solomon (2005), existential philosophy is an existential attitude of disoriented individual’s toward a changing and confusing world. To him, this confusion is an additional product of those changes, which involves “the Renaissance, the Reformation, the growth of science, the decline of Church authority, the French Revolution, the growth of mass militarism and technocracy, two world wars, the *triumph* of capitalism, and the sudden onslaught of globalism and its consequences” (p. xi). Even though existentialism, in its developed forms, is a phenomenon of recent times, its origins can be found in the history of philosophy and moreover, in the human beings' pre-philosophical attempts to acquire to some self-understanding (Macquarrie, 1973).

According to Michelman (2008), the first phase of existentialism occurred in Germany after World War I, when the philosophers Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger

developed an original philosophy of existence in the 1920s and 1930s. Jewish religious thinker Martin Buber and the Protestant theologians Rudolph Bultmann and Paul Tillich embarked upon a parallel development in religious thought (Michelman, 2008).

After World War II, the second phase of existentialism took place in France (Michelman, 2008). It was the time that when the thought of Heidegger and Jaspers, together with the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, the dialectical philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel, and the radical subjectivism of Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche were internalized into French intellectual life during the 1930s and 1940s. Kierkegaard brought in existentialist concepts like anxiety, (in)authenticity, choice, commitment, freedom, and responsibility (Michelman, 2008). Kierkegaard considers anxiety as the dizziness of freedom (Kierkegaard, 1980/1844). It is entangled freedom. Kierkegaard (1980/1844) asserts that anxiety is “freedom's actuality as the possibility of possibility” (p. 42). Being is not qualified to have anxiety by its nature (Kierkegaard, 1980/1844).

The chief figure of the phase, which mentioned as 1930s and 1940s earlier, was the French writer and philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre who gained a fame as the leader of existentialist movement. A leftist journal of ideas and letters *Les Temps modernes*, which became the public platform for Sartrean existentialism, was released by Sartre with his fellow philosophers Simone de Beauvoir and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Albert Camus, who was already well-known as a novelist, became friend with Sartre for a time and became associated with the movement. On the other hand, French Catholic philosopher Gabriel Marcel asserted precedence as the first French philosopher of existence and became linked with the movement as Sartre's antithesis (Michelman, 2008).

According to Sartre (2007/1946), existentialism is a doctrine that makes human life possible and further asserts that every truth and every action connote an environment and a human subjectivity. Existence comes before essence. First of all, man exists, then, he materializes in the world and encounters himself, and finally, defines himself. In the beginning, he is nothing and will not be anything up until he will be what he builds up himself. He states, because there is no God to conceive of it, there is not any human nature. Man is nothing else but that what he makes of himself. Every man is responsible for his own existence and for all men as well. Because of the awareness of his own complete and profound responsibility, man is in anguish. Thus, Sartre (2007/1946) states that “man is condemned to be free: condemned, because he did not create himself, yet nonetheless free,

because once cast into the world, he is responsible for everything he does” (p. 29). To him we are free, thus we should choose or, in other words, invent. There are no ethical codes or signs in the world to tell us what to we do (Sartre, 2007/1946).

According to Heidegger (1962/1927) anxiousness is a basic form of Being-in-the-world. Particularly, Heidegger states that (1962/1927) anxiety manifests in “Dasein its *Being towards* its own most potentiality-for-Being-that is, its *Being-free for* the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its *Being-free for* the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is.” (p. 232). As mentioned earlier *Dasein* means *Being-there* and *Being-in* implies *Being-familiar with*. However, in anxiety one feels uncanny (not-being-at-home). That is to say, everyday familiarity falls apart. Being-in gets into the *existential mode* of the not-at-home. Moreover he discusses death, which he defines as the *end* of Being-in-the-world. He considers death as an existential phenomenon. To him, the possibility of the certain impossibility of Dasein is the death. Thus, it is the end of Dasein. Further, he adds that anxiety in the face of death is not same as the fear in the face of one's demise. Instead, as a basic state-of-mind of Dasein, it stands for the fact that Dasein exists as thrown Being towards its end (Heidegger, 1962/1927).

In Spain, philosopher José Ortega y Gasset independently develops an existentialist philosophy that akin to Sartre's in the 1930s and 1940s. In Italy, the philosopher Nicola Abbagnano develops a different strand of existentialism in the 1940s and 1950s. In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, existentialism was spreaded to the United States and to other countries around the world (Michelman, 2008).

There is a disagreement about where the origin of the word *existentialism* comes. On one hand, it is believed that the term coined by the French writer Louis Lavelle. On the other hand, it is believed that, in 1940, the term coined by Gabriel Marcel to refer to Sartre and de Beauvoir (Cogswell, 2008). Even though Sartre and de Beauvoir accepted the term a couple of years later in 1945 (Reynolds, 2006), almost everyone who was labeled an existentialist denied that he/she was an existentialist (Marino, 2004). Also, there is no consensus between thinkers labeled as *existentialists* on fundamental matters as God, religion, politics, and ethics (Judaken & Bernasconi, 2012). Existentialism meant different things to different people and each piece of writing about existentialism was distinct (Cogswell, 2008). Therefore, it is hard to define existentialism (Marino, 2004). It is not a single doctrine that

put forth by one person or group. Instead of thinking it as a compatible system of philosophy, it should be seen as an extensive rebellion toward traditional philosophy (Cogswell, 2008).

What unites the existentialists is their emphasis on the existence of each human being, particularly on the whole being of each person (Gordon, 1999) and number of overlapping themes that appears in their writings (Aho, 2014). Panza and Gale (2008), gives absurdity, alienation, anxiety, forlornness, responsibility, authenticity, individuality, passion/engagement, and death as an examples of those recurring themes.

As an interdisciplinary movement, existentialism's influence can be found in the genres of philosophy (e.g., Edmund Husserl), literature (e.g. Fyodor Dostoevsky, Ralph Ellison, Franz Kafka, Marcel, Sartre, de Beauvoir, and Camus), and psychotherapy (e.g. Rollo May, Viktor Frankl, and Ludwig Binswanger) (Marino, 2004).

2.2. Existential Psychology

Existential psychology is one of the subdivision of psychology, which interested in individual's relation to the main life dilemmas and the important questions of life. It focuses on both the positive and negative dimensions of life. Instead of logically and systematically categorizing the life, it intends to catch the feeling of life itself. Moreover, existential psychology intends to involve basic philosophical reflections in our psychological understanding and forming the basis for existential therapy, counselling, and coaching (Jacobsen, 2007).

Because existentialists study the individual (or the existent) in the concrete actuality of his/her existence, they apply the research methods of phenomenology in order to study being which has resulted in many exceedingly influential psychological insights (Clemence, 1966). Existential psychology differentiates from other psychology disciplines in its focus on the phenomenological perspective. Also, it differs from other disciplines by calling for that psychology's primary attention should be on human life and individual's relationship with life's fundamental conditions and most important questions (Jacobsen, 2007).

Existential psychology is hinge upon the existentialist principles of the emphasis of the individual, and action as an agent of change and a new realities' creator (Cogswell, 2008). Building on existential philosophy, existential psychology is the sum of concepts, theories and empirical knowledge that informs us the way human being's interaction with the important questions of life and the way fundamental conditions governing life arise and

are handled with in daily life situations. Today, the main application of existential psychology is in the field of therapy. People are invited to find their feet when faced with the most important life issues by existential therapist (Jacobsen, 2007). Cogswell (2008), gives the names of Viktor von Weizsäcker, Ludwig Binswanger, Medard Boss, Rollo May, Leslie H. Farber, Viktor Frankl, Silvano Arieti, Carl Rogers, Hans Trub, Erwin Straus, and Ronald D. Laing as examples of the psychological theoreticians and psychotherapeutic practitioners who were highly influenced by the existential philosophers. Jacobsen (2007), extends those examples by giving the names of Karl Jaspers, Erich Fromm, Ernesto Spinelli, Emmy van Deurzen, Charlotte Bühler, Gion Condrau, Otto Rank, and Irvin D. Yalom,

Besides its application in the field of therapy, existential psychology also takes its place in experimental studies. These studies include: psychological confrontation with death, trauma, the body, and nature; the human quest for meaning, identity, and significance; culture, morality, justice, nostalgia, religion, attachment, social identity, shared subjective experience, ostracism, perspective taking, shame, guilt, freedom, and will. Moreover, terror management theory, lay epistemics, uncertainty management, systems justification, and self-determination theory are all closely related to existential psychology (Greenberg, Koole, & Pyszczynski, 2004). Existential anxieties will be the focus of this study.

2.2.1. Existential anxieties

According to Yalom, there are four ultimate existential anxieties: death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness (Yalom, 1980). He calls them as the givens of existence. They are specific intrinsic features that are an unavoidable part of the human being's existence in the world. Through deep personal reflection, which requires solitude, silence, time, and freedom from the everyday distractions, one can discover the nature of these existential anxieties. Also, specific urgent experiences can catalyze this process of reflection. He calls these experiences as boundary situations. With its other name border situations, it contains experiences as individual's confrontation with death, important irrevocable decisions, and the breaking down of main meaning-providing schemas (Yalom, 1980).

Existential anxiety concerns are prevalent and positively correlated with anxiety, depression, and psychological distress associated to identity problems (Weems, Costa, Dehon, & Berman, 2004). Westman's (1992) study results showed that there was a positive correlation between participants' scores on existential anxiety and "identity confusion, feeling responsible toward others but fearing emotional closeness with them, seeing people

as fundamentally different and not seeing oneself as living on in one's tasks or projects” (p. 1064).

On account of easing the individuals' dealing with her existential anxiety towards authenticity, using an existential approach with the phenomenological method is a good method for therapist to build a strong therapeutic alliance (Temple & Gall, 2018). Moreover, it is found that cognitive-existential therapy significantly reduced the existential anxiety and cognitive distortions in the older people (Barekati, Bahmani, Naghiyaaee, Afrasiabi, & Marsa, 2017). According to Garrow and Walker (2001), existential group therapy can help to supply life meaning, to ease social support, and to enhance dealing with grief, loss, chronic illness, and death for older adults.

2.2.1.1. Death

“*The end of Being-in-the-world is death.*” (Heidegger, 1962/1927, p. 276-277).

According to Yalom (1980), the most evident and the most easily understood existential anxiety is death. We exist now, but eventually our existence will end. Death will catch us eventually, there is no getaway. We react to that horrible truth with a mortal terror. Yet we must live in despite of that fear. The tension between being aware of the inescapability of death and our desire to go on existing creates *death anxiety*.

Yalom (1980), also uses words such as *fear of death*, *mortal terror*, or *fear of finitude* for *death anxiety*. Fear of death can be experienced in various ways. However, according to him, if we want to be more precise, ceasing to be, in other words extinction or annihilation, is exactly what makes us fear about death. Thus, the implication of dissolution of one's world is what makes death so terrifying. Moreover, the meaning-giver and audience dies with death too, and the individual confronts with nothingness in real. From the most conscious to the deepest unconsciousness, this fear of death exists at every level of awareness (Yalom, 1980).

The death fear has a crucial part in our inner experience; it bothers as more than anything; it grumbles constantly under the surface; it is a dark, disturbing presence at the edge of consciousness. The fear of death is everywhere with us and it is so big that the denial of it consumes an abundant amount of our life energy. Transcendence death is an important motif in individual's experience. According to him, from the most deeply personal internal phenomena to the most public macro societal structures we can see its influence. He also

associates our filling time, fondness to distractions, belief in the myth of progress, urge to succeed, and desire to lasting fame with death (Yalom, 1980).

It is not common to come across with primal death anxiety in its original form since it is instantly transformed to different state. At the early age of childhood, we are pondered with death and our main developmental duty is to cope with horrific fear of mortality. To avoid from anxiety of death, the child develops denial-based defense mechanisms that persist into adulthood. Those protective mechanisms become highly complex set of mental operations by passing through several stages and suppress death anxiety. When the defenses against death anxiety are maladaptive, it leads to clinical syndromes. Ineffective modes of death transcendence are the reason of psychopathology. To put in a different way, death is the primal source of anxiety and, thus, of psychopathology (Yalom, 1980).

According to Yalom (1980), the child has two main defense mechanisms against death anxiety: beliefs in specialness and the ultimate rescuer. Even though they are supported by parental and religious explanations, they are based on the child's early life experience too. The specialness defense mechanism is the person's deep belief in his/her personal invulnerability and imperishability. Every person, firstly as a kid and later as an adult, hangs on to an irrational belief of specialness. Even though, at a conscious level, we are all aware of our basic boundaries and that we are same with others, deep down each of us believes that the rule of mortality does not apply to us. Limits, aging, and death are valid for other people, not for us. We can find the roots of this primal belief in the dawn of life. Early life is a time of intense egocentricity for everyone. There are not any boundaries between a person and other objects and beings; the person is the universe. The person is molded with a sense of specialness, and that belief is summoned for a protection toward anxiety of death by the person. This denial reflects both an attempt to overcome anxiety related to the threat to life and a function of a deep belief in personal immunity (Yalom, 1980).

The ultimate rescuer defense mechanism is the person's deep belief in a unique personal rescuer (Yalom, 1980). According to him, as belief in specialness, the roots of this belief can be found in the in the earlier life as well, in the time that the parents are powerful movers and eternal servants for their kids. The parent's caring watchfulness during early years reinforces this belief (Yalom, 1980).

The beliefs in specialness and the ultimate rescuer help the developing child: they are the certain basis of the defense structure that the person builds toward anxiety of death.

The person builds other secondary defenses, which frequently hide the main defenses and the nature of the primal anxiety, upon them. However, from time to time some jarring experience causes collapse in defenses and allows anxiety of death to leak into consciousness. Nevertheless, the unconscious ego quickly fixes it and hides the anxiety's source again (Yalom, 1980).

Yalom (1980), calls jarring experiences, which let anxiety to elude from defenses and seep into consciousness, as *boundary situations*. It is an immediate experience that impels someone to an encounter with his/her own existential situation in the world. He provides an example from his own experience in which he involved in a car accident. Even though he was lucky and did not have any serious physical injury, the other driver suffered severe injuries. He states that, after that experience, the world seemed unstable and lost its hominess to him (Yalom, 1980). He further describes the change that he experienced as an *uncanniness* by referring to Heidegger. Both Heidegger (1962/1927) and Yalom (1980) regard the experience of *not being at home in the world* as a usual result of awareness of death.

According to Yalom (1980), an encounter with one's own death (my death) is the unique border situation and can allow an enormous change in the way one lives. Death can transfer a person from one state of being to a higher one by acting as a catalyst. Thus, "from a state of wondering about how things are to a state of wonderment that they are" (p. 160). Death awareness makes a person to stay away from unimportant preoccupations and to live life with great depth. Thus, it provides a completely different perspective to a person. Recognition of death can transport a person to a more authentic mode from a mode of living qualified by diversions, assuagement, and anxieties. Lifelong consideration of death enriches life. Yalom (1980) asserts that: "Although the physicality of death destroys man, the idea of death saves him" (p. 30).

To sum up, life and death are not independent; they exist together, not successively; death is always at the backstage of life and has a significant effect on our experience and behavior. Thus, death is inseparable part of our life. It is the reminder for the fact that existence cannot be procrastinated. Also, that we still have time for life (Yalom, 1980).

Among the existential anxieties, death anxiety is probably the most studied one (e.g., Harding, Flannelly, Weaver, & Costa, 2005; Saleem & Saleem, 2019; Sawyer, Brewster, & Ertl, 2019; Tang, Wu, & Yan, 2002). Indeed, there is an important firm theory related to that

particular anxiety: Terror Management Theory, depending on the idea that the mortality awareness generates the potential for overwhelming terror (Greenberg et al., 1990; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). TMT hypothesizes that investing in cultural worldviews and self-esteem helps to protect individual from anxiety of death. Thus, accessibility of death-related thought (mortality salience) should cause raised worldview and self-esteem defense and striving (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010).

According to Maxfield, John, and Pyszczynski (2014), the search for meaning, personal value, and interpersonal relations that motivates much human behavior is caused, partly, by the need to control the death anxiety. Other death anxiety studies tried to associate it with different demographic variables. For instance, it is found that female participants tend to report higher levels of death anxiety compared to male participants (Harding et al, 2005; Saleem & Saleem, 2019; Sawyer et al., 2019; Tang et al., 2002). Higher religiosity is related to lower death anxiety (Harding et al, 2005; Saleem & Saleem, 2019; Wen, 2010). Moreover, older participants report lower levels of death anxiety (Sawyer et al., 2019; Tang et al., 2002).

2.2.1.2. Freedom

“Man is condemned to be free.” (Sartre, 2007/1946, p. 29),

Yalom calls his second existential anxiety, which is less accessible, as freedom. Generally, we regard freedom as a positive concept. However, contrary to its usual connotations, he associates freedom with dread. Freedom refers to the lack of external structure from an existential perspective. To him, we do not enter (and leave) a well-structured universe which has an inherent design, opposed to everyday experience. Instead, each person is responsible from his/her choices, actions (and one's failures to act), and life design. We are the author of our own world. From this point, freedom has a frightening meaning: there is no ground beneath us. Therefore, confronting with groundlessness and wishing for ground and structure creates the *freedom anxiety* (Yalom, 1980).

Yalom (1980), stresses the importance of the concept of *responsibility* when discussing existential anxiety of freedom. Even though responsibility has many connotations, he uses *responsibility* in a particular sense. By referring to Jean-Paul Sartre's use of the word *responsibility*, he asserts that responsibility means authorship. To him, if we think deeply, we can see that responsibility accounts for existence. According to Yalom (1980), awareness of one's responsibility “is to be aware of creating one's own self, destiny, life predicament, feelings and, if such be the case, one's own suffering” (p. 218). From this

view, responsibility is inseparably connected to freedom. The concept of responsibility has no meaning as long as the individual is not free to create the world in a different ways. The universe is coincidental; everything could have been created in a different way (Yalom, 1980).

Individual's attitude towards his/her place is the main characteristic of being human, and inferences about human nature depend merely on measurable behavior are distortions of that nature. Yalom (1980), does not repudiate the role of environment, genetics, or chance in one's life. Unfortunate occurrences can happen to everyone. However, we are responsible for how to respond and deal with those unfortunate occurrences. Thus, recognition and acceptance of the unfortunate occurrences do not mean to take a passive stance toward one's external environment. Fully accepting the responsibility means that one fills the world with meaning and that individual is free and responsible for altering his/her environment as long as it is possible (Yalom, 1980).

Awareness of one's responsibility is a terrifying insight. It implies that apart from one's own creation, nothing in the world has any importance. Thus, there is not any external referent; there are no principles, ethical systems, or values. It is a dizzying sensation to experience existence in this way. Nothing is like it seemed before. The ground beneath the person seems to be opened. In point of fact, the term groundlessness, is frequently used for a subjective experience of awareness of responsibility (Yalom, 1980).

Confrontation with freedom occurs when the structure-providing social and psychological institutions in individual's lives damaged. If there are not any rules, grand designs, and nothing we have to do, then we are free to choose what we do. It does not mean that our main nature has changed, rather, it can be said that, we are closer than ever to experiencing the existential facts of life with the elimination of freedom-concealing diversions and breaking down of externally imposed structure. However, he states that, we are not prepared; it is more than we can bear and anxiety tries to get released. We involve in frantic search to protect ourselves from freedom at both individual and social levels (Yalom, 1980).

When confronted with the anxiety of groundlessness, we seek relief. That is to say, we give same response as when we face the anxiety. We can protect ourselves in a many different ways. Firstly, because the groundlessness anxiety is not apparent in daily experience (contrary to death anxiety), it is hardly sensed by the adult and possibly child not

experiences it at all. Even though some people have flashes of it, usually, it stays far from awareness. We stay away from situations that would make us aware of our groundlessness if deeply considered. We seek something that is bigger than ourselves like a structure, authority, or great designs. That's why children do not like freedom and require limit setting, and also panicky psychotic patients show the exact need for structure and limits. Because the denial of death is an ally of groundlessness denial, other defenses toward the groundlessness anxiety contain the usual defenses that used toward being aware of *my death*. Nevertheless, to him, possibly the most powerful defense of all is the appearance of things, that is to say, it is merely reality as it is experienced. To see ourselves as primal constitutors is to stand against reality like we normally experience it. The knowledge that the world is *there*, and that we enter and leave it comes from our sense data. But, appearances serves as denial: we form the world in a way that it appears to be independent of our structure. Establishing the world as an experimental world implies to establish it as something independent from us (Yalom, 1980).

Moreover, Yalom (1980), gives examples of some particular psychic defenses that defend the individual from awareness of responsibility: compulsivity, displacement of responsibility to another, denial of responsibility, avoidance of autonomous behavior, and decisional pathology. Compulsivity is a defense mechanism, in which the person creates a psychic world that he/she does not live free but exists under the influence of some irresistible ego-alien (not-me) force. Also, many individuals stay away from personal responsibility by displacing it to another. In another defense mechanism, individuals may deny the responsibility by considering themselves as innocent victims or by claiming that they lost control. Moreover, they may reject to take a step even though they may know what they can do to aid themselves feel better. Decisional pathology is about wishing and deciding (the building blocks of creation) which will be discussed later (Yalom, 1980).

He asserts that the therapist discovers an uninvited presence of *guilt* in the process of existential psychotherapy. For him, guilt is the dark shadow of responsibility. However, he uses the term guilt in a somewhat different meaning from its traditionally used ones. Yalom (1980), states that: "each human being has an innate set of capacities and potentials and, furthermore, has a primordial knowledge of these potentials" (p. 279). *Existential guilt* is a deep, powerful feeling that experienced when one not lives as fully as one can. In existential guilt, a person may not only be guilty of the crime he/she committed against another person or, moral or social law, but he/she may also be responsible for committing a crime against

himself/herself. Therefore, the individual is as guilty as he/she is responsible for himself/herself and his/her world (Yalom, 1980).

According to Yalom (1980), in the process of change, first step is the awareness of one's responsibility. He points out the word responsibility as *response + ability* and states that the word itself indicates that capability, which is the ability to respond. After being aware of one's responsibility, one must dedicate oneself to some action. By involving interplay between individual's physical and interpersonal world, action transports one beyond oneself. Action do not necessarily require great, or even observable, movement. Even an action of a mild glance to another can be an action of great importance at the moment. Indeed, there are two sides of action; the absence of action can be a significant action too (Yalom, 1980).

According to Yalom (1980), the psychological construct which labelled as *will*, and its functions labelled as *willing* are also highly important in the process of change. He states that, even though the term *will* has many different and conflicting definitions, no word other than *will* fulfills his purpose. He discusses the definitions of will such as *effort trigger*, *mainspring of action*, and *responsible mover* and regards them as good descriptions of the term. However, he considers the explanation of will as *responsible mover* is the most useful one. In the process of change (action), the will is needed. Nevertheless, *will power* forms the first and a thin layer of *willing*. At this point, he goes one step back and states that wish comes before the will by referring to May. We reflect ourselves into the future by way of the will, and the beginning of that process starts with the wish. Thus, without a prior wish, meaningful action is not possible. One begins via wishing and then act out via choice. If an individual has not accession to his/her desires and cannot wish, then, he/she cannot project oneself into the future and cannot act for oneself (Yalom, 1980).

After materialization of wish, the willing process is initiated and is eventually turned into action. The process of transformation between wish and action requires commitment. He prefers to use the term *decision* or *choice* for that transformation process. To decide indicates that action will come after it. If there is no true decision, an action will not occur. If there is no genuine willing, wishing will occur without action. Also, if action happens without wishing, it means that there is not any *willing*; it was just an impulsive activity (Yalom, 1980).

Because wishing entails feeling, if one is helped to feel, one's capacity to wish will be directly eased. If feelings are not the source of one's wishes, and something else like rational deliberation or moral imperatives is the source of one's wishes, then, they are not wishes anymore. Instead, they are *shoulds* or *oughts*, and to him, it means that one's communication with one's real self is blocked. Wish is not just thought or aimless imagination; it includes an affect and a constituent of force. Therefore, when affect is hindered, the experience of one's wishes is not possible, and the whole process of willing is blocked. After one fully experiences wish, he/she encounters with decision or choice. To decide means devoting oneself to the flow of action. If action does not come after decision, he believes that one only flirted with decision and it was a failed decision not true one (Yalom, 1980).

As mentioned before, awareness of one's existential situation means one's awareness of self-creation too. Awareness of the truth that individual forms himself/herself, that there are not any certain referents, and that he/she attributes a meaning to the world arbitrarily, implies awareness of his/her main groundlessness. Decision can push the individual into such awareness. According to Yalom (1980), decision, particularly an irretrievable decision, "is a boundary situation in the same way that awareness of *my death* is a boundary situation" (p. 319). Transfer one from the everyday mode to the *ontological* mode, a mode that one is mindful of his/her existence, by acting as a catalyst. Because this transfer invites anxiety, one represses decision like one represses death if not prepared. That is to say, an important decision confronts one with the anxiety of groundlessness, and also poses a threat to one's defense mechanisms against death anxiety. Decision presents a challenge to the myth of personal specialness by confronting the one with the possibilities' limitations. Also, because the decision pushes individual to accepting responsibility and existential isolation, it poses a threat to myth of the ultimate rescuer. Decision is a lonely and one's own act, thus, it makes one to face with one's existential isolation in the world. Because of those reasons, lots of people have problems in making decisions and try different ways to avoid taking decisions (Yalom, 1980).

Existential guilt also can block one to make decision because of the reasons that it arises from one's regrets, unattempted possibilities, or awareness of the unlived life. It may remind one to how much he/she sacrificed and wasted his/her one and only life. Thus, to Yalom (1980), responsibility "is a two-edged sword: if one accepts responsibility for one's life situation and makes the decision to change, the implication is that one alone is

responsible for the past wreckage of one's life and could have changed long ago” (p. 320). And his recommendation to deal with guilt is via compensation; an individual cannot use his/her will backwardly but can compensate for the past by changing the future (Yalom, 1980).

As mentioned earlier, decisions are tough because renunciation, existential anxiety, and guilt come with it. Thus, it is predictable that one will develop methods to avoid making a decision. For example, procrastination is one of the most obvious method to avoid making a decision. Methods that allow individual to decide while hiding from himself/herself that he/she is deciding are examples of subtler methods for avoiding a decision. All in all, the process of decision is distressing, not the content of it. One must generate defense mechanisms against these threats in order to mitigate the awareness and pain of decision. (Yalom, 1980).

According to Yalom (1980), one method to avoid making a decision is *trading down*. As mentioned earlier, decision is tough because one must let it go the unchosen possibilities, then, if one arranges the situation so that one renounces less, the decision becomes more appropriate. In another defense, one may devaluate the unchosen alternative. When alternatives in a decision are perceived to be almost equal, the sense of freedom increases. Thus, the discomfort and fear, which comes with the freedom, also increase. In order to make decision comfortably, the chosen alternatives should be considered as attractive while the unchosen ones should be considered as unattractive. At an unconscious level, one enlarges small distinctions between two identical options in order to render the decision between them evident and pain free. Therefore, decisions can be made without an effort, and one can completely avoid from the distressing confrontation with freedom (Yalom, 1980).

Moreover, one may delegate the decision to someone to avoid pain of making a decision. As mentioned before, decision is also distressing because it makes us to face with our fundamental isolation. If one can find and convince someone to decide for oneself, one can accept that decision and avoid the pain of existential isolation. Delegating the decision to something can be also used as another defense mechanism. Letting fate to made decision is an ancient mode of decision making. It is not important where the fate's answer is. Instead, that one avoids the existential pain inherent in decision by transferring decision to an outside agency is important (Yalom, 1980).

Even though it is hard to find a study that particularly studied the freedom anxiety, there are studies which included freedom anxiety with the other three existential anxieties (e.g., Barekati et al., 2017; Garrow & Walker, 2001; Temple & Gall, 2018; Weems et al., 2004; Westman, 1992). Bruce, Schreiber, Petrovskaya, and Boston's (2011) findings suggest that an experience of groundlessness starts the process of existential suffering. The experience of groundlessness leads to a process that conceptualized as "Longing for Ground in a Ground(less) World, a wish to minimize the uncomfortable or anxiety-provoking instability of groundlessness" (p. 7). According to Bruce et al. (2001), yearning for ground is appeared as in three overlapping ways: "by turning toward one's discomfort and learning to let go (engaging groundlessness), turning away from the discomfort, attempting to keep it out of consciousness by clinging to familiar thoughts and ideas (taking refuge in the habitual), and learning to live within the flux of instability and unknowing (living in-between)" (p.7).

2.2.1.3. Isolation

"No matter how close each of us becomes to another, there remains a final, unbridgeable gap; each of us enters existence alone and must depart from it alone."
(Yalom, 1980, p. 9)

Yalom (1980), calls his third existential anxiety as isolation. It's an isolation from creatures and world. That is to say, existential isolation is the unbridgeable gap between the individual and other beings. Indeed, it is a split between the person and the world. He uses the phrase *separation from the world* for describing existential isolation which continues in spite of the most pleasing encounter with others and complete self-knowledge and integration. Thus, the tension between being aware of isolation and wishing for getting in touch, shelter, to be part of a bigger whole creates the existential conflict (Yalom, 1980).

He distinguishes existential isolation from interpersonal isolation (experiences of loneliness, isolation from other individuals) and intrapersonal isolation (isolation from parts of oneself). The kinds of isolation are experienced similarly; they can feel the similar as and disguise for one another. Moreover, their borders are semipermeable. For instance, according to him, existential isolation is frequently kept within manageable limits through interpersonal connection. Existential isolation and interpersonal isolation are complicatedly interlaced. Getting out from interpersonal union pushes one into existential isolation. The driving force at the back of many interpersonal relationships is the fear of existential

isolation. The relationship problem is actually a problem of union-isolation. While the individual must learn to connect with the other without allowing the desire of escaping from isolation by becoming part of that other, on the other hand he/she must learn to connect with the other without using the other as a tool, a defense mechanism against existential isolation which will be discussed later (Yalom, 1980).

In order to explain the relationship between existential isolation and death, he likens existential isolation to the valley of solitude, which has many entranceways. Confronting with death and freedom will inescapably carry the person into that valley. What makes one totally realize that no one can die with one or for one is the knowledge of *my death*. Dying is the loneliest human experience at the main level. He also associates existential isolation with existential freedom. The individual is alone in as much as he/she is responsible for his/her life. Responsibility requires authorship. Thus, awareness of one's authorship implies to abandon the belief of creator and guardian of oneself. Loneliness is built in the act of self-creation (Yalom, 1980).

We do not solely form ourselves but we also form a world in a way to hide the fact that we have formed it (Yalom, 1980). Even though existential isolation penetrates the root of the world, it is so hidden by personally and collectively meaningful layer of worldly artifacts that we solely experience a world of everydayness. We are surrounded by a world in which all objects and beings are interrelated and in which we feel *at home in*. We are soothed by a sense of comfortable, daily belongingness; broad emptiness and isolation is hidden and quietened (it merely speaks in short explosions during nightmares). Nevertheless, in the moments when the curtain of reality opens for a moment, we may take a glance at machinery at the backstage. He believes that every self-reflective individual experiences these moments. In these moments, when objects lost their meaning, symbols tear into pieces, and the person is torn from his/her cozy feeling of *at-homeness*, a sudden defamiliarization takes place. By referring to Heidegger, he states that sense of the *uncanny* (of not being at home) can be evoked by experiences where one is alone and where daily guidelines are abruptly abolished (e.g. a hiker who lost his/her way, driving in a foggy weather, and social explosions like The Holocaust). We do not need any external stimulus to find this empty experience; it is within us, not *out there*. A serious, inward search will be enough to find it (Yalom, 1980).

Experiencing existential isolation creates an extremely disturbing subjective state, and just like any form of dysphoria, one cannot tolerate it for long. Unconscious defenses act on it and rapidly hide it out of the scope of consciousness. Because the isolation is within one and always waiting to be noticed, the defenses must work continuously. According to Yalom (1980), we will fight in indirect ways to find safety unless we bring forth the inner strength, the sense of personal worth and solid identity that allows us to confront isolation anxiety and to take it into ourselves. The awareness of existential isolation and the psychic defense mechanisms that we use to soothe anxiety are not conscious. The individual is aware that he/she cannot be alone, that he/she hopelessly wishes something from other people that he/she will never be able to get it, and that something usually goes awry with his/her relations no matter how much he/she tries. Most of the safety seeking methods that he discusses are relational. That is to say, they include interpersonal relationships, however, in each case the individual does not *care for* the other but uses the other as a tool (Yalom, 1980).

Even though no relationship can extinguish existential isolation, love may compensate for the pain of isolation when aloneness shared. He believes that one will be able to turn lovingly toward others if he/she can accept his/her isolated situations in existence and face with them decisively. Otherwise, one's relationships will not be true relationships, instead, it will be something displaced, gone awry, distorted. We will not relate to others as beings like ourselves, but as tools or equipment. The other will be placed in one's world for a function. Of course, the basic function is to deny existential isolation. However, the hidden terror is so close to the awareness of this function. Thus, greater hiding is required; metafunctions come out; and we establish relationships that ensure a product that in turn serves to deny existential isolation. One sacrifices selfhood; immerses in some other individual, cause, or pursuit in order to avoid from isolation anxiety (Yalom, 1980).

The universal conflict of human beings is that while struggling to be an individual, one should bear to frightening isolation that comes with the being an individual. Denial is the one's most used common method to deal with this conflict. One constitutes a delusion of fusion and declares that he/she is not alone, but is part of others. Thus, one weakens one's ego boundaries and becomes part of another person or of a larger group that goes beyond the person. Those people, whose main orientation is fusion, usually named as *dependent*. They suppress their own needs; they try to find out the others' wishes and make them as their own wishes. Instead of individuation, they choose safety and fusion (Yalom, 1980).

Fusion eradicates existential isolation in a fundamental way by eradicating self-awareness (Yalom, 1980). Pleasant moments of fusion are unreflective: the sense of self is lost. Instead of losing it by fusing with another person, one may also lose it by fusing with a group, a purpose, and a project. Fusing with a larger group is extremely irresistible. One can be saved from the isolation of selfhood by being like everyone else. The group's lure is so powerful that one sacrifices the self. Indeed, both *I* and the fear of aloneness become lost. Freedom and self-awareness are the enemies of conformity. Another example to loss of self is the mysticism, which contains boosted, amazing moments of oneness with the universe. Fusion with another individual, group, cause, nature, or universe usually requires a loss of self and results in existential guilt (Yalom, 1980).

One who is afraid of isolation usually tries to relieve that fear via an interpersonal way (Yalom, 1980). In order to confirm one's existence, he/she is in need of the presence of others. The individual either wants to be swallowed by others greater than oneself or tries to relieve the sense of lonely helplessness by swallowing others. The point is, the individual does them not because he/she wants it, instead, because he/she has to do. The relationship is based on survival. The tragic irony is that those who are least able to form an authentic relationship are the ones who hopelessly need the coziness of such a relationship (Yalom, 1980).

In order to confront existential isolation, one must first detach oneself from the other. That is to say, to experience aloneness, one must be alone. What lets one to eventually connect with another deeply and meaningfully is the confrontation with aloneness. Those who face and discover their isolation can learn to connect in a mature loving way to other people (Yalom, 1980).

To sum up, according to Yalom (1980), there is not any solution for isolation. It is part of our existence, and we must confront it and discover a way to take it into ourselves. Our main available source to assuage the dread of isolation is *communion with others*. We are all alone and aware of existential isolation and helplessness. If we can see the others' loneliness, the sense of isolation will give way to affection for other people and this loneliness will not seem so frightening anymore (Yalom, 1980).

When we look at the existential isolation studies, for instance, Costello (2017) found that while existential isolation positively correlated with generalized anxiety, depression, self-concealment, and interpersonal isolation, it negatively correlated autonomy,

competence, relatedness, life satisfaction, performance self-esteem, appearance self-esteem, perceived social support, and overall physical health. Moreover, male participants showed significantly higher levels of existential isolation compared to female participants (Costello, 2017). According to Pinel (2018), people with high levels of existential isolation are particularly drawn to those with whom they have reason to believe they I-share.

In another study, the relationship between feelings of existential isolation and death-thought accessibility (DTA) as an indicator of a weak anxiety buffer was examined. Researchers expected that participants high in existential isolation would exhibit higher levels of baseline DTA and found mixed support to their expectation (Helm, Lifshin, Chau, & Greenberg, 2019). Moreover, Helm, Greenberg, Park, and Pinel (2019) proposed a model of existential isolation which predicts lower certainty, lower levels of basic need satisfaction, higher dispositional death-thought accessibility, lower purpose in life, and lower meaningfulness. It is stated that existential isolation has a positive correlation with general anxiety, social anxiety, and depression (Helm, Greenberg, Park, & Pinel, 2019).

2.2.1.4. Meaninglessness

"I see many people die because they judge that life is not worth living... I therefore conclude that the meaning of life is the most urgent of questions." (Camus, 1975/1942, p. 11-12)

Yalom (1980), calls his fourth existential anxiety as meaninglessness. He asks questions like: If we have to die, if we create our own world, if everyone is alone in the end, then what is the meaning of (my) life? What does it anything makes sense? Why and what do we live (for)? How we will live? Why were we put in this universe? According to him, the problem is "how does a being who needs meaning find meaning in a universe that has no meaning?" (p. 423). We are meaning-seeking creatures who are put into a universe that that does not have any meaning and this dilemma creates the existential conflict (Yalom, 1980).

It seems that the human being require meaning; living without meaning, goals, values, or ideals, seems to arouse substantial amount of distress. In its severe form one may decide to end one's own life. However, from existential perspective, the world is coincidental; human beings create themselves, their world, and their position in that world; there is no meaning, no great design, no guidelines except those we create for ourselves. If there is no pre-ordained design for us, then everyone must create their own meanings in life.

However, he asks that can a meaning that we created be strong enough to endure one's life? (Yalom, 1980).

Meaning, which implies to sense or coherence, is a common word for what is intended to be expressed by something (Yalom, 1980). A search for meaning means to a search for coherence. He compares cosmic meaning with terrestrial meaning. While the question of *what is the meaning of life* is related to cosmic meaning, the question of *what is the meaning of my life* is related to terrestrial meaning. The first question is about whether life in general, or at least human life, complies with whole coherent pattern. On the other hand, the second question is about purpose: having a sense of meaning makes one to experiences life as having some purpose or function to be met, some important goal(s) to which to dedicate oneself. While cosmic meaning refers to magical or spiritual order of the universe and great design existing out of and superior to the individual that is, terrestrial meaning refers to personal sense of meaning which may have totally secular foundations. Thus, without having a sense of cosmic meaning, one may have a sense of cosmic terrestrial meaning. However, one who have a cosmic meaning usually also have a terrestrial meaning that accompanies that cosmic meaning (Yalom, 1980).

He discusses some of the secular activities that give human beings with a sense of meaning: altruism (making the world a better place to live in, helping others), dedication to a cause (e.g. the family, the state, a political cause, and science), creativity (to create something new), the hedonistic solution (to let go oneself into the natural rhythm of life, search for pleasure), self-actualization (realizing and actualizing one's inbuilt potential), and self-transcendence (reaching outside of oneself and caring for the others). These activities are not mutually exclusive, most people acquire meaning from a few of them. Moreover, throughout an individual's life cycle, meanings gradually evolve (Yalom, 1980).

According to Yalom (1980), in contemporary culture, human beings' sense of life meaning is decreasing at an increasing rate. In the earlier ages, people were busy with fulfilling more fundamental survival needs like food and shelter. Examining the need for meaning seems to be a luxury for them. Moreover, because religious worldview was giving a comprehensive answer, the question of meaning was latent. They could feel a part of the nature, were living close to the earth, and carrying out the nature's purpose by farming and cooking. But all those meanings have disappeared. A citizen of today's urbanized, industrialized secular world must confront life as being out of the elemental chain of life and

the without a religious-based cosmic meaning-system. Now, there is too much time to think about disturbing questions. Meaninglessness is intricately interlaced with leisure and with disengagement: the more one is occupied with the everyday course of living and surviving, the less the problem appears. Confrontation with death, boundary experiences, or some important upheaval that immediately rips out the ritual and tradition of the social order are examples of situations that push one into a crisis of meaning. Further, he states that some people go through a crisis of meaning as a consequence of psychotherapy (Yalom, 1980).

We handle our existential situation in the same way we confront and organize random stimuli and events in our everyday world (Yalom, 1980). When we come across an indifferent and unpatterned world, we experience dysphoria and look for patterns, explanations, and the meaning of existence. We feel annoyed, dissatisfied, and helpless when we cannot find a coherent pattern. The belief that one has decoded meaning comes with a sense of mastery. Even though the meaning-schema that one has decoded contains the idea that one is weak, helpless, or dispensable, still it is more relieving than a state of obscurity. It is clear that we crave meaning and feel disturbed in the absence of it. One discovers a purpose and sticks to it for valuable life. However, if one keeps remembering that one forged the purpose, this purpose will not relieve discomfort effectively. The belief that the meaning is out there and one has found it is much more relieving (Yalom, 1980).

One meaning of meaning is that it soothes anxiety. It alleviates the anxiety that arise from confronting life and a world without an ordered, comforting structure. Another crucial reason why we need meaning is that it brings forth to values which, in return, act synergistically to boost one's sense of meaning. To Yalom (1980), values form a code with respect to which a system of action may be formulated and “lets us to place possible ways of behaving into some approval-disapproval hierarchy” (p. 464). As mentioned before, one creates oneself with a series of continuing decisions. Nevertheless, one cannot remake each and every decision in the course of one's life. For ensuing decisions, specific superordinate decisions, which provide an organizing principle, must be already made. Otherwise, the turmoil of decision making would consume most part of the life (Yalom, 1980).

In addition to providing one a blueprint for personal action, values also make it possible for one to exist in groups. Those belonging to a certain culture have some shared belief system that tells individuals about what is, what must be done, and what others

possibly will do. Social norms arise from a meaning schema that has the consensus of the group, and ensure the predictability essential for social trust and cohesion (Yalom, 1980).

Even though the question of meaning in life is confused by matters belonging to the final anxieties of death, freedom, and isolation, the best way to handle with meaninglessness is through engagement (e.g. to find a home, to search, to create, to build, and to care about other individuals, ideas, or projects). The desire to engage life is always there within the individual, and what the individual need is the removal of obstacles in his/her way. Even though the anxieties of death, freedom, and isolation should be handled directly, one should look away from meaninglessness anxiety and embrace the solution of engagement. Yalom (1980), suggests that “one must immerse oneself in the river of life and let the question drift away” (p. 483).

Miller and Rottinghaus (2014), studied the role of meaning in life with respect to career indecision and state anxiety from Yalom’s existential perspective and found the presence of meaning in life mediated the relationship between career indecision and anxiety. Ozanne, Graneheim, and Strang (2013) found that people with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), disease that brought feelings of life and death anxiety, physical loss, unfairness, guilt, shame and existential loneliness, can create meaning despite the disease. According to Ozanne et al. (2013), meaning was found via “their family and friends, the act of giving and receiving help, the feeling of having a life of their own, and accepting the present” (p. 2147) and finding meaning in life strengthened their will to live. Moreover, Vanhooren’s (2019) case study shows that how experiential–existential psychotherapy could help clients in handling with meaninglessness.

CHAPTER III: THE STUDY

3.1. The Purpose of the Study

As mentioned earlier, existentialism is the philosophy of the essence of human existence, its value, and its meaning (Panza, & Gale, 2008). Because it focuses specific kind of existence, the existence of human beings, and because emotions play significant role in human life, it is hard to leave out emotions when discussing existentialism. Even though many existentialists talked about emotions (e.g., Heidegger, 1962/1927; Kierkegaard, 1980/1844; Nietzsche 1989/1887; Sartre, 1993/1948), there appeared almost no empirical study on examining the effects of four existential anxieties (death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness) on emotions.

On the basis of emotion and existential anxiety studies, I came up with a research question that whether different existential anxieties will lead to different emotion/feeling scores or not. Thus, the objective of this project is to find out the effects of existential anxieties (death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness) on emotion/feeling scores. Because of the difficulty of defining emotions, feelings were also included in our study. The expectation is that different existential anxieties will lead to different emotion/feeling scores.

First, ethics approval was obtained. Then, in order to identify emotion and feeling words, the dictionary study was conducted. In the dictionary study, lexicography of Turkish emotion and feeling words was made. In Pilot Study 1, participants' feelings about the existential anxiety texts, which were based on Yalom's (1980) book of *Existential Psychotherapy*, were asked. By taking into consideration the dictionary study, Pilot Study 1, and literature, 47 different Turkish emotion/feeling words were selected in order to be used in the main study as an emotion/feeling scale.

Moreover, in Pilot Study 2, for curiosity, after reading same existential anxiety texts, participants were asked to write down what kind of photo, picture, or graphic they visualized in their mind about each concept of anxiety. Same question for the opposite concept of each anxiety was also asked. By taking into consideration the participants' responses, 9 paintings from 3 different categories (3 paintings for each category) were selected to be used in the main study. The intention was to see whether different existential anxieties will change the likings of different paintings.

Finally, in the main study, by making little changes in the existential anxiety texts participants were randomly assigned to each condition (death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness). After reading the text that they were assigned to, they were asked to rate their feelings according to emotion/feeling scale in order to see the effects of type of existential anxieties on emotions/feelings. Then, participants' likings of 9 different paintings from 3 different categories were also asked. The expectation was that different existential anxieties will change the likings of those paintings. The results of the study will be discussed later.

3.2. Pilot Studies

In order to form an emotion/feeling scale, Pilot Study 1 was conducted. The main purpose of creating a new emotion/feeling scale was to include as many as emotion/feeling words into the scale. Therefore, in Pilot Study 1, lexicography of Turkish emotion and feelings words was made and an open-ended question that participants' feelings about the existential anxiety texts was asked.

Also, for curiosity, to see whether different existential anxieties will change the likings of different paintings Pilot Study 2 was conducted. After reading same existential anxiety texts, participants were asked to write down what kind of photo, picture, or graphic they visualized in their mind about each concept of anxiety. Also, same question for the opposite concept of each anxiety was asked. Paintings that used in the main study were selected according to participants' responses.

3.2.1. Pilot study 1

Participants

By using the Qualtrics platform, an online questionnaire, which was posted online for volunteering participants, was created. The resulting sample consisted of 108 Turkish participants ($M_{age} = 37.25$, $SD = 11.58$). Participants were 65 female ($M_{age} = 33.34$, $SD = 9.82$) and 43 male ($M_{age} = 43.16$, $SD = 11.62$).

Materials and Procedure

An online questionnaire was posted in order to collect participants. First, participants signed the informed consent form. Second, they were asked to fill the demographic form, which consisted of questions about their gender, age, religiosity and their anxiety level at the moment. Third, participants were required to read 4 different texts about existential anxieties

(death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness) which were randomly presented. Then, after reading each text, an open-ended question about the participants' feelings about the text they read was asked. Also, after writing about each text, in order to distract participants' attention, they were required to respond two basic math questions (see Appendix A).

Demographic form. Participants were asked to indicate their birth year and gender (1 = female, 2 = male, 3 = transgender, 4 = do not want to state). Also, they were asked to indicate how religious they identify themselves and how anxious they feel at the moment from 0 to 10 by using a slider.

Existential anxiety questions. Death (N = 95), freedom (N = 98), isolation (N = 97), and meaninglessness (N = 95) anxiety texts were randomly presented to participants. The texts about 4 different existential anxieties were based on the Yalom's (1980) book of *Existential Psychotherapy*. The order of the texts was randomized by using the randomization quality of Qualtrics. After reading each text, participants were asked to write down how the text made them feel.

Math questions. After each existential anxiety text, two basic math questions were asked in order to avoid contamination and distract participants' attention.

Results

According to independent-samples t-tests results, participants' religiosity scores ($M = 4.28$, $SD = 2.70$) and anxiety levels ($M = 4.81$, $SD = 2.78$) did not significantly differentiated according to their gender. The content analysis of existential anxiety questions was made by hand. By taking into consideration the literature, the dictionary study, and content analysis, 47 different emotion/feeling words were selected in order to be used in the Emotions/Feelings Scale: korku (fear), kaygı (anxious), üzgün (sad), bıkkın (sick of), pişman (regret), nefret (hate), umutsuz (hopeless), öfke (angry), depresif (depressive), melankolik (melancholic), şüpheli (skeptical), dehşet (dread), tedirgin (uneasy), yorgun (tired), yalnız (alone), boşluk (empty), bunalmış (bored), çaresiz (desperate), gergin (nervous), karmaşık (complicated), şaşkın (puzzled), suçlu (guilty), iğrenmiş (disgust), kaybolmuş (lost), tutsak (captive), yabancılaşmış (alienated), utanç (shame), bulantı (nausea), hayal kırıklığı (disappointment), anlamsız (meaningless), hissiz (numb), nostaljik (nostalgic), nötr (neutral), mutlu (happy), anlaşılmalı (understood), rahatlamış (relieved), özgür (free), değerli (valued), enerjik (energetic), güçlü (strong), gururlu (proud), cesaretli (brave), sevgi dolu (love), sakin (calm), iyimser (optimistic), huzurlu (peaceful), heyecanlı (excited).

3.2.2. Pilot study 2

Participants

Data was collected from 29 Turkish 4th grade students ($M_{age} = 23.45$, $SD = 1.35$). In order to include participants who has some knowledge about existential anxiety concepts, students who were taking Existential Psychology course were participated to the experiment. Participants were 22 female, 6 male, and one of the participant did not want to state his/her gender. In exchange of extra course credit, participants were asked to fill the online questionnaire which was constituted in the Qualtrics platform.

Materials and Procedure

After signing the consent form, participants filled the demographic form, which consisted of questions about their gender and age. Then, same 4 texts that used in Pilot Study 1 were randomly presented to participants. After reading each text, an open-ended question about description of what kind of photo, picture, or graphic that participants visualized in their mind about each concept of anxiety was asked. Also, after describing specific anxiety, another open-ended question about the opposite concept of that anxiety were asked to the participants. For example, after asking to describe concept of *death*, they were required to describe what kind of photo, picture, or graphic they visualized in their mind about *life* (see Appendix B).

Demographic form. Participants were asked to indicate their birth year and gender (1 = *female*, 2 = *male*, 3 = *transgender*, 4 = *do not want to state*).

Existential anxiety questions. Death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness anxiety texts, which were used in the Pilot Study 1, were randomly presented to participants by using the randomization quality of Qualtrics. After reading each text, 2 open-ended questions about existential anxiety texts were asked to the participants. In the first open-ended question, participants were asked to describe what kind of photo, picture, or graphic they were visualized in their mind about each concept of anxiety. In the second open-ended question, participants were asked to describe what kind of photo, picture, or graphic they were visualized in their mind about the opposite concept of that anxiety. The concept of *life* as an opposite of *death*, the concept of *meaning* as an opposite of *meaninglessness*, the concept of *connection/fusion* as an opposite of *isolation*, and the concept of *structure/limitation* as an opposite of *freedom* were asked.

Results

The content analysis of both open-ended questions were made by hand. While emptiness ($N = 8$), darkness ($N = 11$), and graveyard/coffin ($N = 8$) were the most recurring themes for the concept of death, nature ($N = 11$), mobility/activity ($N = 9$), sun ($N = 6$), people ($N = 6$), and sky ($N = 5$) were the most recurring themes for the concept of life. For the concept of isolation, aloneness ($N = 8$) and lonely human figure in crowds ($N = 6$); for the concept of connection/fusion, people who were together ($N = 21$); for the concept of meaninglessness, emptiness ($N = 7$) and a human figure doing nothing ($N = 4$); for the concept of meaning, mobility/activity ($N = 8$) and happy people ($N = 5$) were the most recurring themes. Even though for the concept of freedom the themes were very diverse, immense (uçsuz bucaksız) ($N = 3$) and sky ($N = 3$) were the conspicuous themes. On the other hand, for the concept of structure/limitation, captivity ($N = 15$) was the most recurring theme.

By taking into consideration these results, 9 different paintings were selected according to 3 different categories (3 for each category) from WikiArt website platform in order to be used in the main study. Paintings that include human figures, abstract, and nature paintings were used as 3 different categories.

3.3. The Study of Existential Anxieties and Emotions & Feelings

In the main study, the research question that whether different existential anxieties will lead to different emotion/feeling scores or not was tested. The existential anxiety texts that were used in both pilot studies were used for manipulation with few changes. Emotions/feelings scale, which formed taking into consideration to Pilot Study 1, was used in order to see the whether existential anxiety texts have any effect on participants' emotions/feelings. After testing the factorability of 47 items of Emotions/Feelings Scale, 2 subscales as positive and negative emotions/feelings were obtained. Thus, while death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness existential anxiety texts were used as 4 levels of independent variable, negative and positive emotions/feelings subscales were used as 2 dependent variables.

3.3.1. Participants

Missing values and participants aged under 18 were deleted. Also participants who scored 10 in each items of Emotions/Feelings Scale were deleted. In order to compare 4 groups, a medium effect size ($f^2 = .06$) was assumed. To achieve a power of .95 and an alpha

of .05, the minimum required sample size for a MANOVA was calculated as 180. However, in order to maximize statistical power and control for potential attritions, 292 participants ($M_{age} = 30.37$, $SD = 10.34$) were recruited from an online questionnaire.

Participants were 159 female ($M_{age} = 30.33$, $SD = 9.943$), 129 male ($M_{age} = 30.58$, $SD = 10.951$), and 4 ($M_{age} = 24.75$, $SD = 2.63$) of the participants did not want to state their gender. 220 of the participants indicated their religion as Islam, one of them indicated as Judaism. 56 of the participants indicated that they do not believe in any religion and 15 of them signed the other choice.

3.3.2. Materials & procedures

Ethics approval was obtained. Like Pilot Studies, data collected via internet by using the Qualtrics platform. After signing the informed consent form, participants were randomly assigned to 4 different experimental condition (death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness). Later, by taking into consideration the text that participants were assigned to, they were asked to fill the Emotions/Feelings Scale. Also, 9 different paintings were randomly presented to the participants and they were asked to indicate how much they liked the each painting. Finally, participants were required to fill the demographic form (see Appendix C).

Existential anxiety manipulation. Death (N = 75), freedom (N = 80), isolation (N = 69), and meaninglessness (N = 68) anxiety texts were presented to participants. The texts about 4 different existential anxieties were based on the texts that were used in both pilot studies. Each participant read one of the existential anxiety texts. The participants were randomly assigned to each condition by using the randomization quality of Qualtrics.

Emotions/Feelings Scale. 47 different emotions/feelings expressions (*fear, anxious, sad, sick of, regret, hate, hopeless, angry, depressive, melancholic, skeptical, dread, uneasy, tired, alone, empty, bored, desperate, nervous, complicated, puzzled, guilty, disgust, lost, captive, alienated, shame, nausea, disappointment, meaningless, numb, nostalgic, neutral, happy, understood, relieved, free, valued, energetic, strong, proud, brave, love, calm, optimistic, peaceful, excited*) were presented to participants. Participants were asked to evaluate emotions/feelings expressions from 0 to 10 by using a slider. The randomization feature of Qualtrics was applied for the order of emotions/feelings expressions. After testing the factorability of 47 items, the scale reduced to 2 subscales: negative and positive emotions/feelings subscales.

Paintings. By taking into consideration the Pilot Study 2, 9 different paintings were selected according to 3 different categories (3 for each category) from WikiArt website platform. Paintings that include human figures, abstract and nature paintings were randomly presented to participants by using the randomization quality of Qualtrics. After each painting, participants were asked to indicate how much they liked the painting from 0 to 10 by using a slider.

Demographic form. Participants were asked to indicate their birth year, gender (1 = female, 2 = male, 3 = transgender, 4 = do not want to state), and their religion (1 = Islam, 2 = Christianity, 3 = Judaism, 4 = do not believe in any religion, 5 = other).

3.3.3. Results

The factorability of the 47 items of Emotions/Feelings Scale was examined. Firstly, it was observed that all of the items correlated at least .5 with at least one other item, suggesting reasonable factorability. Secondly, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was .948, above the usually recommended value of .6, and Bartlett's test of sphericity was also significant ($p < .001$). Moreover, the diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix were all over .5, and the communalities were all above .4. Given these overall indicators, Factor Analysis was considered to be suitable for 47 items.

Since the main purpose was to reduce the items of Emotions/Feelings Scale to a smaller set of composite scores, Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was used. Also, because factors were expected to be correlated, an Oblimin rotation was performed. Initial eigen values indicated that six components had eigen values over one. The first four factors explained 35%, 16%, 3%, and 3% of the variance respectively. The fifth and sixth factors had both explained 2% of the variance. Taking into consideration to the leveling off of eigen values on the scree plot after first two factors, the insufficient number of primary loadings, and difficulty of interpreting the last three factors, extraction of 2 factors, which explained 52% of the variance, was preferred. Because the item nostalgic cross-loaded, and the item neutral did not loaded at all, they were eliminated. Also, because the communality score of numb score was less than .4, it was deleted.

For the final stage, a Principal Components Factor Analysis with Oblimin rotation of the remaining 44 items was conducted. Two factors were found to be explaining 53% of the variance and all items found to have primary loadings over .50 (see Table 1). Internal consistency for each of the subscales was examined using Cronbach's alpha. The alpha

found to be .97 for the negative emotions/feelings subscale (30 items) and .94 for the positive emotions/feelings subscale (14 items) (see Table 2).

Table 1. *Factor loadings and communalities of 44 items of the Emotions/Feelings Scale (N =292)*

	Factor 1: Negative	Factor 2: Positive	Communalities
Hopeless	.809		.636
Sick of	.806		.637
Bored	.801		.639
Depressive	.786		.605
Lost	.777		.587
Sad	.762		.573
Hate	.760		.586
Disappointment	.758		.599
Disgust	.746		.565
Nervous	.744		.582
Uneasy	.743		.554
Angry	.736		.576
Nausea	.729		.546
Captive	.721		.521
Alienated	.705		.496
Desperate	.705		.484
Anxious	.705		.492
Melancholic	.702		.487
Fear	.686		.477
Skeptical	.675		.477
Alone	.675		.448
Empty	.664		.433
Meaningless	.647		.408
Tired	.647		.473
Regret	.645		.410
Guilty	.637		.435
Dread	.625		.447
Puzzled	.618		.499
Complicated	.615		.371
Shame	.548		.489
Peaceful		.828	.664
Happy		.821	.658
Love		.816	.671
Valued		.795	.640
Energetic		.795	.651
Optimistic		.784	.612
Strong		.778	.604
Brave		.748	.605
Relieved		.705	.499
Proud		.697	.550
Free		.682	.450
Excited		.675	.519
Understood		.623	.394
Calm		.617	.372
Eigenvalue	15.9	7.5	
% of Total Variance	36.18	17.051	

Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the negative and positive emotions/feelings subscales ($N = 292$)

	No. of Items	$M (SD)$	Skewness	Kurtosis	Cronbach's α
Negative	30	2.66 (2.09)	0.670	-0.232	.97
Positive	14	3.52 (2.55)	0.278	-0.899	.94

A one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to determine the effect of the type of existential anxiety on positive and negative emotions/feelings scores. While death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness anxiety conditions were considered as 4 levels of IV, negative and positive emotions/feelings scores were considered as DVs.

Preliminary assumption checking revealed that there were no univariate outliers, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. Negative and positive emotions/feelings scores were not normally distributed for each condition, as assessed by According to Shapiro-Wilk's test ($p < .05$). Also, there was no multicollinearity, as assessed by Pearson Correlation ($r = .203$, $p = .000$). Taking into consideration to scatterplot, linear relationship between positive and negative emotions/feelings scores in each existential anxiety condition was found. According to Mahalanobis distance ($p > .001$), there were not any multivariate outliers. Moreover, there was homogeneity of variance-covariances matrices, as measured by Box's test of equality of covariance matrices ($p = .312$).

Thus, while assumption of multivariate normality have mixed supports, other findings fulfill the basic assumptions for MANOVA. According to results, participants in death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness conditions scored higher in the positive scale ($M = 3.02$, $SD = 2.57$; $M = 3.70$, $SD = 2.23$; $M = 3.47$, $SD = 2.41$, and $M = 3.43$, $SD = 2.43$, respectively) than the negative scale ($M = 2.34$, $SD = 1.80$; $M = 2.69$, $SD = 2.31$; $M = 2.51$, $SD = 1.96$, and $M = 3.12$, $SD = 2.19$, respectively) (see Table 3). In order to have clear idea about means of each emotions/feelings items, see the Table 4. The differences between the existential anxiety manipulation on the combined dependent variables was not statistically significant, $F(6, 574) = 1.354$, $p = .231$; Wilks' $\Lambda = .972$; partial $\eta^2 = .014$ (see Table 5).

Table 3. Mean scores of subscales for each experimental condition (N = 292)

Dependent Variables	The Type of Existential Anxiety							
	Death (N =75)		Isolation (N=69)		Meaninglessness (N = 68)		Freedom (N = 80)	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Positive Emotions/Feelings Subscale	3.02	2.57	3.47	2.41	3.43	2.43	3.70	2.23
Negative Emotions/Feelings Subscale	2.34	1.80	2.51	1.97	2.51	1.97	2.69	2.31

Table 4. Mean scores of 47 items of Emotions/Feelings Scale (N = 292)

	Death	Freedom	Isolation	Meaninglessness
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)
Fear	3,44 (3,47)	2,13 (2,53)	2,77 (2,83)	2,51 (2,53)
Anxious	4,05 (3,20)	3,05 (3,23)	3,03 (3,03)	3,84 (3,32)
Sad	2,99 (3,28)	2,48 (2,70)	2,57 (2,69)	3,07 (2,91)
Sick of	2,35 (2,93)	3,31 (3,54)	2,61 (3,11)	3,66 (3,34)
Regret	2,13 (2,85)	2,20 (2,96)	1,71 (2,41)	2,32 (2,85)
Hate	1,05 (1,63)	1,90 (2,80)	1,48 (2,13)	2,15 (3,06)
Hopeless	2,11 (2,59)	2,96 (3,36)	2,46 (2,70)	3,59 (3,34)
Angry	1,69 (2,54)	2,51 (3,11)	1,57 (2,09)	2,47 (3,11)
Depressive	2,63 (2,77)	2,79 (3,18)	2,35 (2,69)	3,60 (3,19)
Melancholic	2,43 (2,82)	2,99 (3,38)	2,90 (2,99)	3,31 (3,25)
Skeptical	1,76 (2,50)	2,91 (2,98)	2,77 (2,72)	3,84 (3,54)
Dread	1,73 (2,60)	1,63 (2,46)	1,67 (2,25)	1,84 (2,64)
Uneasy	3,28 (3,27)	3,01 (3,34)	2,49 (2,54)	3,68 (3,04)
Tired	2,92 (3,23)	3,56 (3,45)	3,39 (2,91)	4,57 (3,57)
Alone	3,05 (3,42)	3,24 (3,45)	5,10 (3,52)	4,19 (3,39)
Empty	3,35 (3,42)	4,00 (3,57)	3,67 (3,04)	3,79 (3,38)
Bored	2,25 (2,67)	3,11 (3,28)	2,41 (2,84)	3,88 (3,49)
Desperate	3,52 (3,66)	2,39 (2,90)	2,62 (2,71)	2,63 (2,81)
Nervous	2,95 (3,15)	2,80 (3,08)	2,59 (2,63)	3,37 (3,17)
Complicated	3,64 (3,30)	3,61 (3,51)	3,49 (3,29)	4,41 (3,40)

Puzzled	1,44 (2,29)	1,91 (2,33)	1,71 (2,16)	2,22 (2,79)
Guilty	1,57 (2,41)	1,78 (2,60)	1,54 (2,06)	2,03 (2,92)
Disgust	0,87 (1,59)	2,18 (3,02)	1,67 (2,34)	2,62 (3,20)
Lost	2,41 (3,09)	3,23 (3,40)	2,68 (2,49)	3,00 (3,12)
Captive	2,04 (2,83)	2,69 (3,11)	2,26 (2,69)	2,81 (2,98)
Alienated	1,75 (2,18)	2,94 (3,13)	3,26 (3,21)	3,26 (3,11)
Shame	0,95 (1,51)	1,53 (2,19)	1,80 (2,58)	1,68 (2,40)
Nausea	1,17 (1,90)	1,89 (2,82)	1,81 (2,52)	2,10 (2,79)
Disappointment	1,76 (2,43)	2,70 (3,04)	2,51 (2,88)	3,28 (3,08)
Meaningless	2,91 (3,21)	3,26 (3,28)	2,57 (2,80)	3,78 (3,43)
Numb	1,79 (2,38)	2,55 (3,01)	3,36 (3,29)	2,84 (2,96)
Nostalgic	2,29 (2,83)	2,45 (2,80)	2,14 (2,69)	2,59 (3,10)
Neutral	3,21 (3,31)	2,99 (3,33)	2,99 (3,10)	3,28 (3,00)
Happy	2,65 (2,92)	3,56 (3,14)	3,06 (3,15)	3,13 (2,86)
Understood	3,37 (3,46)	3,44 (3,11)	3,57 (3,27)	3,01 (3,13)
Relieved	2,73 (3,22)	2,64 (2,74)	3,38 (3,17)	3,01 (3,22)
Free	3,16 (3,33)	4,88 (3,40)	3,99 (3,48)	3,50 (3,04)
Valued	3,41 (3,42)	4,04 (3,30)	3,51 (3,36)	3,57 (3,36)
Energetic	2,47 (3,16)	3,31 (3,17)	2,68 (3,01)	3,50 (3,40)
Strong	3,44 (3,37)	4,53 (3,36)	4,07 (3,55)	3,90 (3,22)
Proud	2,39 (3,09)	3,68 (3,17)	3,04 (3,31)	3,71 (3,31)
Brave	2,67 (3,24)	4,48 (3,24)	3,87 (3,51)	3,76 (3,26)
Love	2,77 (3,55)	3,39 (3,18)	2,99 (3,23)	3,47 (3,46)
Calm	3,97 (3,50)	3,53 (2,80)	4,43 (3,44)	3,60 (3,32)
Optimistic	3,31 (3,32)	3,95 (3,27)	3,43 (3,50)	3,56 (3,18)
Peaceful	3,31 (3,13)	3,43 (3,04)	3,78 (3,29)	3,15 (3,09)
Excited	2,60 (2,96)	3,01 (3,03)	2,75 (2,90)	3,07 (2,89)

Table 5. *MANOVA results of the existential anxieties' effect on emotions/feelings (N = 292)*

	Wilks' Λ	<i>F</i>	Df	<i>P</i>
Anxiety	0.972	1.354	6, 574	0.231

3.3.4. Manipulation check

Participants

Just like early mentioned studies, an online questionnaire, which was posted online for volunteering participants, was created by using the Qualtrics platform. The resulting sample consisted of 175 Turkish participants ($M_{age} = 29.95$, $SD = 9.86$). Participants were 124 female, 48 male, one transgender, and 2 of the participants did not want to state their gender. 131 of the participants indicated their religion as Islam, 32 of the participants indicated that they do not believe in any religion, and 12 of them signed the other choice.

Materials and Procedure

After signing the informed consent form, participants were randomly assigned to 4 different experimental condition (death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness) which were same as in the main study. After reading the existential anxiety text that they were assigned to, participants were asked to fill the 25-items of, which were also randomized, Existential Anxiety Scale. Finally, participants were asked to fill the demographic form.

Existential anxiety manipulation. Death ($N = 44$), freedom ($N = 45$), isolation ($N = 42$), and meaninglessness ($N = 44$) anxiety texts were presented to participants. The texts about 4 different existential anxieties were same as used in the main study. Each participant read one of the existential anxiety texts. The participants were randomly assigned to each condition by using the randomization quality of Qualtrics.

Existential Anxiety Scale. Yıkılmaz's (2016) Existential Anxiety Scale, which consists of 25-items, used as a manipulation check. Items were randomized by using the randomization quality of Qualtrics. Items were evaluated on 5-point Likert scale (1 = *not at all like me*, 2 = *not much like me*, 3 = *neutral*, 4 = *somewhat like me*, 5 = *very much like me*). The scale consists of 4 subscales: death (5, 7, 16, 20, and 25 numbered items), isolation (3, 4, 12, 21, and 22 numbered items), meaninglessness (1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 13, 15, 17, 18, and 19 numbered items), and freedom (10, 11, 14, 23, and 24 numbered items). 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 13, 15, 17, 18, and 19 numbered items were the reverse items.

Demographic form. Participants were asked to indicate their birth year, gender (1 = *female*, 2 = *male*, 3 = *transgender*, 4 = *do not want to state*), and their religion (1 = *Islam*, 2 = *Christianity*, 3 = *Judaism*, 4 = *do not believe in any religion*, 5 = *other*).

Results

Items of the existential anxiety scale were grouped and averaged under the 4 subscale. Testing assumptions of a one-way MANOVA were tested before conducting it. There were 10 univariate outliers, which were deleted, in the data, as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. In order to determine if data is normally distributed, Shapiro-Wilk's test conducted. Existential anxiety scores were not normally distributed in death condition ($p < .05$). While freedom scores were not normally distributed ($p < .05$), other existential anxiety scores were normally distributed in meaninglessness condition ($p > .05$). Also, while death and meaninglessness scores were not normally distributed ($p < .05$), freedom and meaninglessness scores were normally distributed in isolation condition ($p > .05$). In freedom condition, while meaninglessness scores were not normally distributed ($p < .05$), other existential anxiety scores were normally distributed. Thus, there were mixing results regarding the normal distribution of the data. According to Pearson correlation results, there was no multicollinearity. There were a mixing results for determining linear relationship between existential anxiety scores in each condition, as assessed by scatterplot. There were no multivariate outliers in the data, as tested by Mahalanobis distance ($p > .001$).

A one-way MANOVA was conducted to see the effect of type of existential anxiety manipulation on existential anxiety scores. Box's test of equality of covariance matrices showed that there was homogeneity of variance-covariances matrices ($p = .08$). According to Levene's Test of Homogeneity of Variance, while there was homogeneity of variances for death and meaningless condition ($p > .05$), there was not for other conditions. A one-way multivariate analysis of variance results showed that the differences between the existential anxiety conditions on the combined dependent variables was not statistically significant, $F(12, 418) = 1.295, p = .218$; Wilks' $\Lambda = .908$; partial $\eta^2 = .032$.

CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION

Existentialism is the philosophy of the essence of human existence (Panza & Gale, 2008). From the perspective of existentialism, existential anxieties (death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness) are specific intrinsic properties that are an unavoidable part of the human being's existence in the world (Yalom, 1980). Since both existential anxieties and emotions play significant role in human life, they are the main focus of the present study. Even though many existentialists talked about emotions (e.g., Kierkegaard, 1980/1844; Nietzsche 1989/1887; Sartre, 1993/1948) and existential anxieties (e.g., Heidegger, 1962/1927; Yalom, 1980), there appeared almost no empirical study on examining the effects of four existential anxieties (death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness) on emotions. Therefore, the main purpose of the present study was to find out the effects of death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness existential anxieties on emotions/feelings. Because of the close relationship between emotion and feeling, feelings were also included in the study. However, the expectation that different existential anxieties will lead to different emotions/feelings scores could not find the support.

First, on the basis of emotion literature, new Emotions/Feelings Scale decided to be formed. The main purpose of this decision was to include as many as emotions/feelings expressions. In order to identify emotion and feeling words, lexicography of Turkish emotion and feeling words made in the dictionary study. Also, in Pilot Study 1, an open-ended question about participants' feelings about the existential anxiety texts were asked. By taking into consideration the literature, dictionary study, and content analysis of Pilot Study 1, 47 different Turkish emotions/feelings words were selected for the Emotions/Feelings Scale. Then, for simplicity reasons, the factorability of the 47 items of Emotions/Feelings Scale was examined. Accordingly, 30 items used as a negative emotions/feelings score and 14 items used a positive emotions/feelings scores.

Second, for curiosity, in order to see whether different existential anxieties will affect the likings of different paintings, the Pilot Study 2 was conducted. After reading existential anxiety texts, participants were asked to write down what kind of photo, picture, or graphic they visualized in their mind about each concept of anxiety. Same question for the opposite concept of each anxiety was also asked. By taking into consideration the participants' responses, 9 different paintings were selected according to 3 different

categories (3 for each category). Paintings that include human figures, abstract, and nature paintings were used as 3 different categories.

Finally, in the main study, the effect of type of existential anxieties on emotions/feelings and painting liking scores were examined. However, neither emotions/feelings nor the painting liking scores were significantly changed according to existential anxiety conditions. Since existential anxiety concerns are positively correlated with symptoms of anxiety, depression, and psychological distress associated to identity problems (Weems, Costa, Dehon, & Berman, 2004), non-significant result of its' effect on emotions/feelings scores are surprising. While negative emotions/feelings scores was expected to be higher, mean scores of positive emotions/feelings scores found to be higher even they were non-significant.

There might be several explanations for this result. First, since confrontation with existential anxieties are highly stressing and defense mechanisms are in charge at that process (Yalom, 1980), it is possible that denial occurred. According to Yalom (1980), those defense mechanisms against existential anxieties begin to develop at early age. There are some experimental studies examining the defense mechanisms that take place when the particular existential anxiety is evoked (e.g., Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999; Van Tongeren, & Green, 2010). As mentioned earlier, death anxiety is probably the most studied one (e.g., Harding et al., 2005; Saleem & Saleem, 2019; Sawyer et al., 2019; Tang et al., 2002) among the existential anxieties. Related with death anxiety, according to Terror Management Theory, which depends on the idea that the mortality awareness generates the potential for overwhelming terror (Greenberg et al., 1990; Rosenblatt et al., 1989), hypothesizes that individuals tend to respond defensively to reminders of death. Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon (1999) provided experimental evidence that separate and distinct defensive systems are activated to defend against both conscious and nonconscious but accessible thoughts of death. Accordingly, when thoughts of death are in current conscious attention, proximal defenses (suppressing death-related thoughts or pushing the death threat into the distant future) are activated. On the other hand, when thoughts of death are accessible but not in current conscious attention, distal defenses (maintaining self-esteem and faith in one's cultural worldview) are activated (Pyszczynski et., 1999).

In a different study, Van Tongeren and Green (2010) examined how individuals automatically defend against threats to meaning. According to the results, when meaning was threatened, individuals report being more religious and having more meaningful lives. Moreover, individuals report increased self-esteem, need for closure, symbolic immortality, and a decreased need to belong (Van Tongeren, & Green, 2010). Therefore, the reason behind not obtaining higher negative emotions/feelings scores could be the defense mechanisms that come into play when existential anxieties evoked. Since in the Pilot Study 1, instead of reporting feelings, some of the participants gave answers like “I agree”, “I disagree”, “Nonsense”, “True”, and “Wrong” about the text. Also, it is seen that some of the participants gave third person expressions instead of describing their own feelings.

Second, brief texts that discussing existential anxieties may not be enough to generate existential anxieties. Manipulation check results support this explanation. Virtual reality simulations might be more useful for generating those existential anxieties. Third, participants may not be honest in their responses, since admitting to feel negative emotions is not preferable. Instead of collecting data via online questionnaire, using Galvanic Skin Response (GSR) measurements during the experiment might give more concrete idea about participants’ current feelings. Finally, even though those 4 existential anxieties are different, they are also quite interrelated with each other (Yalom, 1980). The reason behind not finding any group differences might be related to that case.

Considering the limitations of the study, including the Galvanic Skin Response (GSR) measurements and virtual reality simulations to the experiment, and testing the manipulation check at the same with bigger samples, may be beneficial for further studies. Even though, the expectations could not find support, the present study is important as being the first (as far as I know) to test the effect of four existential anxieties together on emotions/feelings.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Pilot Study 1

The Informed Consent Form

Sayın katılımcı,

Bu çalışma, Başkent Üniversitesi, Psikoloji Bölümü öğretim üyesi Prof. Dr. Doğan Kökdemir ve yüksek lisans öğrencisi Dicle Rojda Tasman tarafından yürütülen bir tez çalışmasının parçasıdır. Vereceğiniz bilgiler kimlik bilgileriniz alınmadan tamamıyla gizli tutularak, yalnızca araştırmacılar tarafından, grup düzeyinde değerlendirilecektir. Yardımlarınız ve katılımınız için teşekkür ederiz.

Not: Bu çalışmada sizden istenilen 4 farklı metni okumanız ve size neler hissettirdiğini yazmanızdır.

Çalışma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak için Dicle Rojda Tasman (dicletasman@hotmail.com) ile iletişim kurabilirsiniz.

Çalışmaya gönüllü olarak katıldığınızı kabul ediyor ve vereceğiniz bilgilerin bilimsel amaçlı kullanılmasını kabul ediyorsanız aşağıdaki kutucuğa tıklayarak bir sonraki sayfaya geçiniz.

Kabul ediyorum.

Demographic Form

Doğum yılınız: _____


Cinsiyetiniz:

- Kadın
 Erkek
 Transgender
 Belirtmek istemiyorum.

Kendinizi ne kadar dindar olarak tanımlarsınız?

Lütfen seçiniz.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
											

Şu anda kendinizi ne kadar kaygılı hissediyorsunuz?

Lütfen seçiniz.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
											

The Death Anxiety Question

Şu anda varız, yaşıyoruz. Fakat her şey gibi biz de bir gün yok olacağız. Ölüm önünde sonunda bizi de yakalayacak, ondan kaçış yok. Üstelik her ne kadar ölümden korksak, dehşete kapılsak da bir gün öleceğimiz gerçeğiyle yaşamak zorundayız. Yaşam ve ölüm bir aradadır. Ölüm hayatımızın arka perdesinde kendisini belli etmekte ve davranışlarımızla deneyimlerimiz üzerinde önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Ölüm korkusu hayatımızın her alanında ve o kadar büyüktür ki yaşam enerjimizin önemli bir miktarı ölümün inkarıyla tüketilir. Bu ölümün kaçınılmazlığının farkındalığı ve aynı zamanda yaşamaya devam etme isteği arasındaki çatışma "ölüm kaygısı"na neden olur.

Ölüm kaygısıyla ilgili metnin size neler hissettirdiğini aşağıya yazınız.

1. $12 - 24 - 36 - 48 - X$ Sizce X yerine hangi sayı gelmelidir?

2. $16 + 10 \times 5 - 13$ işleminin sonucu sizce nedir?

The Meaninglessness Anxiety Question

Hayatın anlamı nedir? Neden buradayız? Ne için ve neden yaşıyoruz? Varoluşçuluğa göre, bizim için oluşturulmuş bir dizayn yoktur. Belli bir kılavuz, bizlere “verilmiş” bir anlam yoktur. Dolayısıyla kendi anlamımızı kendimiz oluşturmalıyız. Ancak kişinin yarattığı anlam, hayatını sürdürecekt kadar anlamlı olacak mıdır? Anlam, amaç, değerler veya idealler olmadan yaşamak büyük kaygıya neden olur. Bu kaygı o kadar büyüyebilir ki kişinin hayatını sonlandırmaya karar vermesine kadar ileriye gidebilir. İnsanların kılavuzlara ihtiyacı vardır. Böylelikle hayatlarını bu kılavuzlara göre yönlendirebilirler. Bu anlamı olmayan evrende bizim anlam arayışımız "anlamsızlık kaygısı"na neden olur.

Anlamsızlık kaygısıyla ilgili metnin size neler hissettirdiğini aşağıya yazınız.

1. $49 - 36 - 25 - 16 - X$ Sizce X yerine hangi sayı gelmelidir?

2. $80 - 45 : 9 + 2$ işleminin sonucu sizce nedir?

The Isolation Anxiety Question

Varoluşsal açıdan yalıtım, kişilerarası ve kişinin kendi içindeki yalıtımından farklıdır. Kişinin diğer bütün canlılardan ve dünyadan yalıtımını ifade eder. Hepimiz yalnız var oluruz. Bu dünyaya tek başımıza geldik ve yine bu dünyadan tek başımıza gideceğiz. Başkalarıyla ilişki kurarak bu durumdan kendimizi kurtarmaya çalışsak da hiçbir ilişki yalıtımı saf dışı bırakamaz. Başkalarıyla ne kadar yakınlaşırsak yakınlaşalım arada her zaman kapatılmaz bir boşluk olacaktır. Yalıtımın çözümü yoktur, varoluşumuzun ayrılmaz bir parçasıdır. Mutlak yalıtımımızın farkındalığı ve ilişki kurma, korunma, daha büyük bir bütünün parçası olma arzumuz arasındaki çatışma "yalıtım kaygısı"na neden olur.

Yalıtım kaygısıyla ilgili metnin size neler hissettirdiğini aşağıya yazınız.

1. $4 - 8 - 16 - 24 - X$ Sizce X yerine hangi sayı gelmelidir?

2. $17 - 4 : 2 + 85$ işleminin sonucu sizce nedir?

The Freedom Anxiety Question

Herkes kendi dünyasından, yaşam tarzından, seçimlerinden, eylemlerinden ve eylemsizliğinden kendisi sorumludur. Genetik, çevre, şans gibi kontrol edemediğimiz durumlara karşılaşırsak da onlara karşı tutumumuzdan yine kendimiz sorumluyuz. Bunun farkında olmak, kendi benliğimizi, kaderimizi, hayattaki durumumuzu, duygularımızı, acı çekişimizi kendimizin yarattığının farkında olmamız demektir. Herkes seçtiği şeyi yapmakta özgürdür. Bu anlamda özgürlük dehşet vericidir; referans alınabilecek herhangi bir dışsal yapı yoktur, altımızda hiçbir zemin yoktur, bir boşluk vardır. Zemin ve yapı için duyduğumuz arzu ile bu zeminsizlik arasındaki çatışma "özgürlük kaygısı"na neden olur.

Özgürlük kaygısıyla ilgili metnin size neler hissettirdiğini aşağıya yazınız.

1. $64 - 48 - 32 - 16 - X$ Sizce X yerine hangi sayı gelmelidir?

2. $35 + 10 : 5 - 14$ işleminin sonucu sizce nedir?

APPENDIX B: Pilot Study 2

The Informed Consent Form

Sayın katılımcı,

Bu çalışma, Başkent Üniversitesi, Psikoloji Bölümü öğretim üyesi Prof. Dr. Doğan Kökdemir ve yüksek lisans öğrencisi Dicle Rojda Tasman tarafından yürütülen bir tez çalışmasının parçasıdır. Vereceğiniz bilgiler kimlik bilgileriniz alınmadan tamamıyla gizli tutularak, yalnızca araştırmacılar tarafından, grup düzeyinde değerlendirilecektir. Yardımlarınız ve katılımınız için teşekkür ederiz.

Not: Sizden istenen “ölüm”, “anlamsızlık”, “yalıtım” ve “özgürlük” kaygılarıyla ilgili 4 metni okumanızdır. Daha sonrasında bu dört kaygı ve bunların zıttı (“yaşam”, “anlam”, “bağlanma/birleşme” ve “yapı/sınırlılık”) kavramların zihninizde nasıl bir görsel canlandırdığını tarif etmenizi isteyeceğiz. Bu pilot çalışmada verdiğiniz bilgiler doğrultusunda daha sonraki çalışmayı yürüteceğimizi dikkate alarak çalışmaya başlayabilirsiniz.

Çalışma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak için Dicle Rojda Tasman (dicletasman@hotmail.com) ile iletişim kurabilirsiniz.

Çalışmaya gönüllü olarak katıldığınızı kabul ediyorum ve vereceğiniz bilgilerin bilimsel amaçlı kullanılmasını kabul ediyorsanız aşağıdaki kutucuğa tıklayarak bir sonraki sayfaya geçiniz.

Kabul ediyorum.

Demographic Form

Doğum yılınız: _____

Cinsiyetiniz:

- Kadın
- Erkek
- Transgender
- Belirtmek istemiyorum.

The Death Anxiety Questions

Şu anda varız, yaşıyoruz. Fakat her şey gibi biz de bir gün yok olacağız. Ölüm önünde sonunda bizi de yakalayacak, ondan kaçış yok. Üstelik her ne kadar ölümden korksak, dehşete kapılsak da bir gün öleceğimiz gerçeğiyle yaşamak zorundayız. Yaşam ve ölüm bir aradadır. Ölüm hayatımızın arka perdesinde kendisini belli etmekte ve davranışlarımızla deneyimlerimiz üzerinde önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Ölüm korkusu hayatımızın her alanında ve o kadar büyüktür ki yaşam enerjimizin önemli bir miktarı ölümün inkarıyla tüketilir. Bu ölümün kaçınılmazlığının farkındalığı ve aynı zamanda yaşamaya devam etme isteği arasındaki çatışma "**ölüm kaygısı**"na neden olur.

Zihninizde "ölüm" kavramıyla ilgili nasıl bir fotoğraf, resim veya grafik canlandığını tarif ediniz.

Zihninizde ölümün tam tersi (örneğin "yaşam") kavramla ilgili nasıl bir fotoğraf, resim veya grafik canlandığını tarif ediniz.

The Meaninglessness Anxiety Questions

Hayatın anlamı nedir? Neden buradayız? Ne için ve neden yaşıyoruz? Varoluşçuluğa göre, bizim için oluşturulmuş bir dizayn yoktur. Belli bir kılavuz, bizlere “verilmiş” bir anlam yoktur. Dolayısıyla kendi anlamımızı kendimiz oluşturmalıyız. Ancak kişinin yarattığı anlam, hayatını sürdürecekt kadar anlamlı olacak mıdır? Anlam, amaç, değerler veya idealler olmadan yaşamak büyük kaygıya neden olur. Bu kaygı o kadar büyüyebilir ki kişinin hayatını sonlandırmaya karar vermesine kadar ileriye gidebilir. İnsanların kılavuzlara ihtiyacı vardır. Böylelikle hayatlarını bu kılavuzlara göre yönlendirebilirler. Bu anlamı olmayan evrende bizim anlam arayışımız "**anlamsızlık kaygısı**"na neden olur.

Zihninizde “anlamsızlık” kavramıyla ilgili nasıl bir fotoğraf, resim veya grafik canlandığını tarif ediniz.

Zihninizde anlamsızlığın tam tersi (örneğin “anlam”) kavramla ilgili nasıl bir fotoğraf, resim veya grafik canlandığını tarif ediniz.

The Isolation Anxiety Questions

Varoluşsal açıdan yalıtım, kişilerarası ve kişinin kendi içindeki yalıtımından farklıdır. Kişinin diğer bütün canlılardan ve dünyadan yalıtımını ifade eder. Hepimiz yalnız var oluruz. Bu dünyaya tek başımıza geldik ve yine bu dünyadan tek başımıza gideceğiz. Başkalarıyla ilişki kurarak bu durumdan kendimizi kurtarmaya çalışsak da hiçbir ilişki yalıtımı saf dışı bırakamaz. Başkalarıyla ne kadar yakınlaşırsak yakınlaşalım arada her zaman kapatılmaz bir boşluk olacaktır. Yalıtımın çözümü yoktur, varoluşumuzun ayrılmaz bir parçasıdır. Mutlak yalıtımımızın farkındalığı ve ilişki kurma, korunma, daha büyük bir bütünün parçası olma arzumuz arasındaki çatışma "**yalıtım kaygısı**"na neden olur.

Zihninizde “yalıtım” kavramıyla ilgili nasıl bir fotoğraf, resim veya grafik canlandığını tarif ediniz.

Zihninizde yalıtımın tam tersi (örneğin “bağlanma/birleşme”) kavramla ilgili nasıl bir fotoğraf, resim veya grafik canlandığını tarif ediniz.

The Freedom Anxiety Questions

Herkes kendi dünyasından, yaşam tarzından, seçimlerinden, eylemlerinden ve eylemsizliğinden kendisi sorumludur. Genetik, çevre, şans gibi kontrol edemediğimiz durumlara karşılaşırsak da onlara karşı tutumumuzdan yine kendimiz sorumluyuz. Bunun farkında olmak, kendi benliğimizi, kaderimizi, hayattaki durumumuzu, duygularımızı, acı çekişimizi kendimizin yarattığının farkında olmamız demektir. Herkes seçtiği şeyi yapmakta özgürdür. Bu anlamda özgürlük dehşet vericidir; referans alınabilecek herhangi bir dışsal yapı yoktur, altımızda hiçbir zemin yoktur, bir boşluk vardır. Zemin ve yapı için duyduğumuz arzu ile bu zeminsizlik arasındaki çatışma "**özgürlük kaygısı**"na neden olur.

Zihninizde "özgürlük" kavramıyla ilgili nasıl bir fotoğraf, resim veya grafik canlandığını tarif ediniz.

Zihninizde özgürlüğün tam tersi (örneğin "yapı/sınırlılık") kavramla ilgili nasıl bir fotoğraf, resim veya grafik canlandığını tarif ediniz.

APPENDIX C: The Study of Existential Anxieties and Emotions & Feelings

The Informed Consent Form

Sayın katılımcı,

Bu çalışma, Başkent Üniversitesi, Psikoloji Bölümü öğretim üyesi Prof. Dr. Doğan Kökdemir ve yüksek lisans öğrencisi Dicle Rojda Tasman tarafından yürütülen bir tez çalışmasıdır. Vereceğiniz bilgiler kimlik bilgileriniz alınmadan tamamıyla gizli tutularak, yalnızca araştırmacılar tarafından, grup düzeyinde değerlendirilecektir. Yardımlarınız ve katılımınız için teşekkür ederiz.

Çalışma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak için Dicle Rojda Tasman (dicletasman@hotmail.com) ile iletişim kurabilirsiniz.

Çalışmaya gönüllü olarak katıldığınızı kabul ediyor ve vereceğiniz bilgilerin bilimsel amaçlı kullanılmasını kabul ediyorsanız aşağıdaki kutucuğa tıklayarak bir sonraki sayfaya geçiniz.

Kabul ediyorum.

Group 1: Death Anxiety Manipulation

Şu anda varız, nefes alıyor ve yaşıyoruz. Fakat var olan her şey gibi biz de bir gün yok olacağız. Ölüm önünde sonunda bizi de yakalayacak, ondan kaçış yok. Her geçen saniye kaçınılmaz sona daha çok yaklaşıyoruz. Üstelik bu bir gün öleceğimiz gerçeğiyle yaşamak zorundayız. Dolayısıyla ölümün yaşamımızın ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Ölüm her an hayatımızın arka perdesinde kendisini belli etmektedir. Fakat her ne kadar ölüm bizi kapıda beklese de içten gelen yaşamaya devam etmek isteğimiz bulunmaktadır. Bir yandan ölümün farkında oluşumuz bir yandan da yaşamaya devam etme isteğimiz arasındaki çatışma varoluşumuzun bir parçasıdır.

Yukarıdaki "**ölüm**" kavramıyla ilgili metni göz önünde bulundurarak neler hissettiğinizi aşağıdaki duygu ifadelerine göre değerlendiriniz.

Group 2: Isolation Anxiety Manipulation

Varoluşsal açıdan yalıtım, kişilerarası ve kişinin kendi içindeki yalıtımından farklıdır. Kişinin diğer bütün canlılardan ve dünyadan yalıtımını ifade eder. Hepimiz yalnız var oluruz. Bu dünyaya tek başımıza geldik ve yine bu dünyadan tek başımıza gideceğiz. Başkalarıyla ilişki kurarak bu durumdan kendimizi kurtarmaya çalışsak da hiçbir ilişki yalıtımı saf dışı bırakamaz. Başkalarıyla ne kadar yakınlaşırsak yakınlaşalım arada her zaman kapatılmaz bir boşluk olacaktır. Yalıtımın çözümü yoktur, varoluşumuzun ayrılmaz bir parçasıdır. Bu mutlak yalıtımımızın farkındalığı ve ilişki kurma, daha büyük bir bütünün parçası olma arzumuz arasındaki çatışma varoluşumuzun bir parçasıdır.

Yukarıdaki "**yalıtım**" kavramıyla ilgili metni göz önünde bulundurarak neler hissettiğinizi aşağıdaki duygu ifadelerine göre değerlendiriniz.

Group 4: Meaninglessness Anxiety Manipulation

Hayatın anlamı nedir? Neden buradayız? Ne için ve neden yaşıyoruz? Varoluşçuluğa göre, bizim için oluşturulmuş bir dizayn yoktur. Belli bir kılavuz, bizlere “verilmiş” bir anlam yoktur. Dolayısıyla kendi anlamımızı kendimiz oluşturmalıyız. Fakat kişinin yarattığı anlam, hayatını sürdürece kadar anlamlı olacak mıdır? Anlam, amaç, değerler veya ideallerin olmadığı bir yaşam nasıl sürdürülebilir? İnsan doğası gereği çevresindeki her şeyi anlamlandırmaya çalışır. İnsanların kılavuzlara ihtiyacı vardır. Böylelikle hayatlarını bu kılavuzlara göre yönlendirebilirler. Bu anlamı olmayan evrende bizim anlam arayışımız arasındaki çatışma varoluşumuzun bir parçasıdır.


Yukarıdaki "**anlamsızlık**" kavramıyla ilgili metni göz önünde bulundurarak neler hissettiğinizi aşağıdaki duygu ifadelerine göre değerlendiriniz.

Group 4: Freedom Anxiety Manipulation

Herkes kendi dünyasından, yaşam tarzından, seçimlerinden, eylemlerinden ve eylemsizliğinden kendisi sorumludur. Genetik, çevre, şans gibi kontrol edemediğimiz durumlara karşılaştık da onlara karşı tutumumuzdan yine kendimiz sorumluyuz. Bunun farkında olmak, kendi benliğimizi, kaderimizi, hayattaki durumumuzu, duygularımızı, acı çekişimizi kendimizin yarattığının farkında olmamız demektir. Herkes seçtiği şeyi yapmakta özgürdür. Bu anlamda özgürlük referans alınabilecek herhangi bir dışsal yapının ve altımızda hiçbir zeminin olmadığı anlamına gelir. Bir boşluk vardır. Zemin ve yapı için duyduğumuz arzu ile bu zeminsizlik arasındaki çatışma varoluşumuzun bir parçasıdır.

Yukarıdaki "**özgürlük**" kavramıyla ilgili metni göz önünde bulundurarak neler hissettiğinizi aşağıdaki duygu ifadelerine göre değerlendiriniz.

Abstract Paintings



Yukarıdaki görseli ne kadar beğendiğinizi "0" (hiç beğenmedim), "5" (nötr) ve "10" (çok beğendim) olmak üzere değerlendiriniz.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10



Yukarıdaki görseli ne kadar beğendiğinizi "0" (hiç beğenmedim), "5" (nötr) ve "10" (çok beğendim) olmak üzere değerlendiriniz.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10




Yukarıdaki görseli ne kadar beğendiğinizi "0" (hiç beğenmedim), "5" (nötr) ve "10" (çok beğendim) olmak üzere değerlendiriniz.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10



Nature Paintings




Yukarıdaki görseli ne kadar beğendiğinizi "0" (hiç beğenmedim), "5" (nötr) ve "10" (çok beğendim) olmak üzere değerlendiriniz.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10



Yukarıdaki görseli ne kadar beğendiğinizi "0" (hiç beğenmedim), "5" (nötr) ve "10" (çok beğendim) olmak üzere değerlendiriniz.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10



Yukarıdaki görseli ne kadar beğendiğinizi "0" (hiç beğenmedim), "5" (nötr) ve "10" (çok beğendim) olmak üzere değerlendiriniz.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10




Paintings of People



Yukarıdaki görseli ne kadar beğendiğinizi "0" (hiç beğenmedim), "5" (nötr) ve "10" (çok beğendim) olmak üzere değerlendiriniz.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10



Yukarıdaki görseli ne kadar beğendiğinizi "0" (hiç beğenmedim), "5" (nötr) ve "10" (çok beğendim) olmak üzere değerlendiriniz.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10



Yukarıdaki görseli ne kadar beğendiğinizi "0" (hiç beğenmedim), "5" (nötr) ve "10" (çok beğendim) olmak üzere değerlendiriniz.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10



Demographic Form

Doğum yılınız: _____

Cinsiyetiniz:

- Kadın
- Erkek
- Transgender
- Belirtmek istemiyorum.

Dini inancınız:

- İslam
- Hristiyanlık
- Musevilik
- Herhangi bir dini inancım yok.
- Diğer: _____

APPENDIX D: Manipulation Check

The Informed Consent Form

Sayın katılımcı,

Bu çalışma, Başkent Üniversitesi, Psikoloji Bölümü öğretim üyesi Prof. Dr. Doğan Kökdemir ve yüksek lisans öğrencisi Dicle Rojda Tasman tarafından yürütülen tez çalışmasının bir parçasıdır. Vereceğiniz bilgiler kimlik bilgileriniz alınmadan tamamıyla gizli tutularak, yalnızca araştırmacılar tarafından, grup düzeyinde değerlendirilecektir. Yardımlarınız ve katılımınız için teşekkür ederiz.

Çalışma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak için Dicle Rojda Tasman (dicletasman@hotmail.com) ile iletişim kurabilirsiniz.

Çalışmaya gönüllü olarak katıldığınızı kabul ediyor ve vereceğiniz bilgilerin bilimsel amaçlı kullanılmasını kabul ediyorsanız aşağıdaki kutucuğa tıklayarak bir sonraki sayfaya geçiniz.

Kabul ediyorum.

Group 1: Death Anxiety Manipulation

Şu anda varız, nefes alıyor ve yaşıyoruz. Fakat var olan her şey gibi biz de bir gün yok olacağız. Ölüm önünde sonunda bizi de yakalayacak, ondan kaçış yok. Her geçen saniye kaçınılmaz sona daha çok yaklaşıyoruz. Üstelik bu bir gün öleceğimiz gerçeğiyle yaşamak zorundayız. Dolayısıyla ölümün yaşamımızın ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Ölüm her an hayatımızın arka perdesinde kendisini belli etmektedir. Fakat her ne kadar ölüm bizi kapıda beklese de içten gelen yaşamaya devam etmek isteğimiz bulunmaktadır. Bir yandan ölümün farkında oluşumuz bir yandan da yaşamaya devam etme isteğimiz arasındaki çatışma varoluşumuzun bir parçasıdır.

Yukarıdaki "**ölüm**" kavramıyla ilgili metni göz önünde bulundurarak, lütfen aşağıdaki her bir ifadeyi okuyun ve sizi yansıttığına en çok inandığınız seçeneği işaretleyin.

Group 2: Isolation Anxiety Manipulation

Varoluşsal açıdan yalıtım, kişilerarası ve kişinin kendi içindeki yalıtımından farklıdır. Kişinin diğer bütün canlılardan ve dünyadan yalıtımını ifade eder. Hepimiz yalnız var oluruz. Bu dünyaya tek başımıza geldik ve yine bu dünyadan tek başımıza gideceğiz. Başkalarıyla ilişki kurarak bu durumdan kendimizi kurtarmaya çalışsak da hiçbir ilişki yalıtımı saf dışı bırakamaz. Başkalarıyla ne kadar yakınlaşırsak yakınlaşalım arada her zaman kapatılmaz bir boşluk olacaktır. Yalıtımın çözümü yoktur, varoluşumuzun ayrılmaz bir parçasıdır. Bu mutlak yalıtımımızın farkındalığı ve ilişki kurma, daha büyük bir bütünün parçası olma arzumuz arasındaki çatışma varoluşumuzun bir parçasıdır.

Yukarıdaki " **yalıtım** " kavramıyla ilgili metni göz önünde bulundurarak, lütfen aşağıdaki her bir ifadeyi okuyun ve sizi yansıttığına en çok inandığınız seçeneği işaretleyin.

Group 4: Meaninglessness Anxiety Manipulation

Hayatın anlamı nedir? Neden buradayız? Ne için ve neden yaşıyoruz? Varoluşçuluğa göre, bizim için oluşturulmuş bir dizayn yoktur. Belli bir kılavuz, bizlere “verilmiş” bir anlam yoktur. Dolayısıyla kendi anlamımızı kendimiz oluşturmalıyız. Fakat kişinin yarattığı anlam, hayatını sürdürecekt kadar anlamlı olacak mıdır? Anlam, amaç, değerler veya ideallerin olmadığı bir yaşam nasıl sürdürülebilir? İnsan doğası gereği çevresindeki her şeyi anlamlandırmaya çalışır. İnsanların kılavuzlara ihtiyacı vardır. Böylelikle hayatlarını bu kılavuzlara göre yönlendirebilirler. Bu anlamı olmayan evrende bizim anlam arayışımız arasındaki çatışma varoluşumuzun bir parçasıdır.

Yukarıdaki " **anlamsızlık** " kavramıyla ilgili metni göz önünde bulundurarak, lütfen aşağıdaki her bir ifadeyi okuyun ve sizi yansıttığına en çok inandığınız seçeneği işaretleyin.

Group 4: Freedom Anxiety Manipulation

Herkes kendi dünyasından, yaşam tarzından, seçimlerinden, eylemlerinden ve eylemsizliğinden kendisi sorumludur. Genetik, çevre, şans gibi kontrol edemediğimiz durumlara karşılaştık da onlara karşı tutumumuzdan yine kendimiz sorumluyuz. Bunun farkında olmak, kendi benliğimizi, kaderimizi, hayattaki durumumuzu, duygularımızı, acı çekişimizi kendimizin yarattığının farkında olmamız demektir. Herkes seçtiği şeyi yapmakta özgürdür. Bu anlamda özgürlük referans alınabilecek herhangi bir dışsal yapının ve altımızda hiçbir zeminin olmadığı anlamına gelir. Bir boşluk vardır. Zemin ve yapı için duyduğumuz arzu ile bu zeminsizlik arasındaki çatışma varoluşumuzun bir parçasıdır.

Yukarıdaki " **özgürlük** " kavramıyla ilgili metni göz önünde bulundurarak, lütfen aşağıdaki her bir ifadeyi okuyun ve sizi yansıttığına en çok inandığınız seçeneği işaretleyin.

Existential Anxiety Scale

	Beni hiç yansıtmıyor (1)	Beni çok az yansıtıyor (2)	Beni orta derecede yansıtıyor (3)	Beni oldukça çok yansıtıyor (4)	Beni tamamen yansıtıyor (5)
1. Dünyada bir iz bırakmayı önemsiyorum.					
2. Gelecekte beni bekleyen önemli görevlerim olduğuna inanıyorum.					
3. Sebebini bilmediğim bir can sıkıntısı yaşıyorum.					
4. Kendimi, dünyaya atılmış gibi hissediyorum.					
5. Ölümümü, yaşamımın doğal bir parçası olarak görüyorum.					
6. Uğruna çaba göstermeye değer amaçlara sahibim.					
7. Yaşamımın sona erecek olmasını kabullenemiyorum.					
8. Yaşamda ilgimi çeken şeyler var.					
9. Yaşama bir şeyler katabilmeyi önemsiyorum.					
10. Kararlarımı çoğunluğun görüşüne göre belirliyorum.					
11. Yaşamımla ilgili önemli kararlar vermem gerektiğinde tutulup kalıyorum.					
12. İnsanların dünyasına dahil olamıyorum.					
13. Yapmayı planladığım şeylerin önemine inanıyorum.					
14. Yaşamımı başkalarının denetiminde yaşıyorum.					
15. Yaşam hakkında başkalarına öğretebileceğim değerli şeylerim olduğunu hissediyorum.					
16. Yaşamımın sona ereceğini düşününce boşluğa düşünüyorum.					
17. Yaşamda iyi işler yaptığımı düşünüyorum.					
18. Yapmayı tasarladığım şeylerin doğruluğuna inanıyorum.					
19. Gerçekleştirmeyi tasarladığım şeylerin yararına inanıyorum.					
20. Yok olup gitmekten korkuyorum.					
21. Kendimi, diğer insanlardan soyutlanmış gibi hissediyorum.					
22. Yalnız kaldığımda huzursuzluktan kıvranıyorum.					
23. Tek başına seçim yapmanın sorumluluğundan korkuyorum.					
24. Kendimi güvende hissetmek için diğer insanların yaptıklarını yapıyorum.					
25. Ölüm düşüncesini aklımdan çıkaramıyorum.					

Demographic Form

Doğum yılınız: _____

Cinsiyetiniz:

- Kadın
- Erkek
- Transgender
- Belirtmek istemiyorum.

Dini inancınız:

- İslam
- Hristiyanlık
- Musevilik
- Herhangi bir dini inancım yok.
- Diğer: _____